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In 1988, the United States Supreme Court denied the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa tribes 
constitutional protection of ‘High Country,’ a sacred area in danger of being destroyed by the 
government. The dispute, known as Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association, became infamous for its detrimental effects on legal protection of Native 
American religious beliefs and practices.  
This thesis explores the space of Native American participation in the legal landscape of the 
U.S by framing it in a postcolonial discourse. The Lyng proceedings serve an interesting 
starting point for an analysis of how Native American litigants must navigate the courtroom 
and the law by adhering to the rules and customs of an institution based on an Anglo-
American, and ultimately, colonial heritage. The language of the Supreme Court reveals a low 
degree of understanding of, or respect for, Native American worldviews. Prejudices and 
misconceptions of Native religions are masked by an abstract level of reasoning and a 
purported concern for the rights of the government. This negates indigenous faiths as equal to 
Judeo-Christians under the law, because of the first groups’ often-unfamiliar appearance and 
worldviews. Consequently, many tribes have sought rights protection outside of the 
courtroom. Since 1988, numerous steps haven been made to ensure that the spiritual beliefs 
and practices of Native Americans are secured against private or governmental interests. New 
laws, practices, and public awareness are contributing to right past wrongs, away from the 
shifting support of the U.S. courts. Nevertheless, this form of active agency is important in its 
impact on the postcolonial landscape of law, as well as on the government and the image of 
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Chapter 1 - The Lyng Supreme Court decision as a starting point 
for discussing postcolonial legalities.  
 
“This case […] represents yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between two 
disparate cultures – the dominant Western culture, which views land in terms of ownership and 
use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property are not only alien, but 
contrary to a belief system that holds land sacred.”1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In April of 1988 the United States Supreme Court handed out its ruling in the case of Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Protection Cemetery Association.2 It rejected constitutional protection to an 
area of sacred lands in Northern California against a government development plan. Three 
Native American tribes were denied any support from the judiciary against the probable 
destruction of High Country, a sacred tribal place on government land and under government 
control. Tribal members, indigenous rights activists, and legal scholars of the field were 
shocked. How could the court refute their claims to religious freedom under the highest law 
of the land when the welfare of the tribal spirituality was at stake?  
 
This question is the impetus for the thesis, which takes the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and Native American tribes as a starting point for putting a whole array of questions on 
the relationship between the government and its indigenous people in contemporary USA to 
the test. The empirical focus of this investigation is the Supreme Court case mentioned above, 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. It is an interesting dispute in itself 
for what it reveals of the inherent positioning of U.S. law. Moreover, it generated some very 
tangible consequences that shaped, and continue to shape, Native American agency in the 
legal narrative on religious freedom. The ruling of the Supreme Court set a precedent for the 
scope of the Constitution in protecting tribal religion that rendered it almost impossible for 
                                                
1 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 99 L. Ed. 2nd 534, 
108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988), http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-
bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=485&invol=439 (accessed 10.08.2011), 473 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  
2 Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), hereinafter Lyng in the text. 
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Natives to seek legal protection for similar instances in the future.3 The controversy of the 
decision, and the debate it spurred after, makes this legal case a compelling subject for a study 
on the role of law and judiciaries in wielding power over Native American rights. 
 
1.2 The context for providing scope of the thesis 
The Yurok, Karuk4, and Tolowa peoples of Northern California brought a suit to court in 
order to protect the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest against road 
construction and forest development.5 It was the tribes’ ancestral homeland and they had been 
coming to this area for centuries. After the Europeans invaded that part of the North American 
continent, the indigenous tribes continued their travels to this sacred area, where they 
practiced rituals such as meditations, vision quests, and ceremonies.6 Fast forward to the 
1970’s, when the government (acting through the Forest Service) sought to extract timber 
from the forest, and proposed the construction of a road. The tribes became seriously 
concerned for the welfare of their ancestral lands and saw the action as an infringement upon 
their religious rights. They decided to sue the Forest Service for placing a substantial burden 
on the tribes’ ability to freely practice their faith, as would be protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.7  
 
The case went through the various levels of the legal system, ending up in the Supreme 
Court.8 In 1988, after months of hearings, that court came down with its ruling, which went in 
favor of the Forest Service. Although the majority of the justices acknowledged that the tribes 
would be limited in their access to the Chimney Rock area, they nevertheless sided with the 
government and its right to manage its own property. Moreover, the court reasoned that 
                                                
3‘Precedent’ is a legal concept; a ruling in court by which future decisions must adhere to. 
New Oxford American Dictionary, Mac Version 2.1.3., 2005, Apple Inc.  
4 The tribe is described as ‘Karok’ in the court documents. However, the tribe itself employs 
‘Karuk,’ which I will therefore honor throughout this thesis. See, http://karuk.us  
5 Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
6 Kristin Carpenter and Amy Bowers, “Challenging the Narrative of Conquest: The Story of 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,” in Indian Law Stories, ed. 
Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn, Philip P. Frickey (New York: Foundation Press, 
2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2020681 (accessed April 15, 2012), 493.  
7 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Bill of Rights Transcript Text,” The 
Charters of Freedom, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights.html (accessed 
April 27, 2012). 
8 Carpenter and Bowers (2011), 505-509. 
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because the road construction did not actively punish nor prohibit the Native Americans from 
practicing their faith, the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution could not protect their 
religious rights.9 10 
 
1.3 The context for providing research questions 
By widening the scope we can place the Lyng case within the landscape of the American legal 
system. The Supreme Court relied on a premise that the religious beliefs and practices of the 
California tribes were vastly different from other religions, and especially Judeo-Christian 
ones. If we accept this premise of differing worldviews, we should then look at the relations 
between the two. The court saw fit to make comparisons between the beliefs of the tribes’ and 
that of earlier litigants of other faiths, bringing them all into an abstract level of religion, as 
interpreted under the Constitution. However, acting on that first premise of cosmological 
difference, we are impelled to investigate a second one. In the matter of Lyng, indigeneity is 
the focal point and therefore subject to dynamics of authority and legitimacy between the 
various actors. If we take on a second premise, that these relations play important role in areas 
of law beyond one simple court case, then we need to investigate the role of Native American 
issues in an Euro-American-based legal system.  
 
My reasoning for choosing the Supreme Court is both personal and academic, although they 
are in a manner one and the same. I was lucky enough to spend a semester in the United 
States, studying in the field of Native American studies, at the Montana State University. One 
class in particular caught my interest. It was called Federal Indian Policy and Law, and 
provided me with a whole new area of knowledge on historical-legal issues pertaining to 
Native American tribes. The role of the Supreme Court stood out to me as we studied some of 
the most vital cases, from colonial beginnings to present day. It struck me how much power 
these few justices had over the entire indigenous population in the country, and how much the 
outcome was dependant upon the cultural, religious, and political views of one small group of 
people. Although these societal preconceptions exist in the other branches of government, I 
found it both fascinating and disheartening the role the Supreme Court has played for the past 
                                                
9 Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  
10 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (…)" 
(emphasis added). 
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200 years in challenging and establishing the laws and principles of minority to majority, 
indigenous to conqueror, Native to non-Native, relations.  
 
Native American tribes are continuously dependant upon the court, as a legal entity and as 
real-life actors striving to maintain or regain their rights. The master’s program in Indigenous 
Studies at the University of Tromsø has allowed me to further broaden my horizons, and 
investigate the contemporary outcomes of historical processes. A critical view of 
institutionalized authorities and legitimacies taken for granted are important parts of my 
education, which I strive to bring with me into this project. As an official institution, the 
Supreme Court of the United States is a well-established and respected body of government. 
Yet as the pendulum of political moods swings across, so does naturally the composition of 
justices and their views. Since the U.S. legal system derives from common law, wherein 
customs and judicial principles outlines much of the policy, decisions made by the courts not 
only determines the outcome of one case, but set precedents for years, decades, or centuries to 
come. The Marshall Trilogy of the early 1800s is such an example, as the rulings by the 
Supreme Court on the rights of tribes to hold and sell land put down some of the most central 
concepts of the tribal-to-federal relationship, still in place to date.11 These landmark cases 
have continued to carry weight throughout decades of shifting political climates. Thereby, 
they have served as both a detriment and benefit to the tribes, highlighting the power of the 
Supreme Court.  
 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association stands out because the Supreme 
Court came down with a ruling that at the time seemed to go in the opposite direction of other 
federal policies and interests.12 It was quite a devastating blow to any future attempts by 
Natives to find judicial protection of religious rights, establishing its place of infamy in the 
legal field. As mentioned above, the case has not been overturned, and although only twenty-
four years old it is already among the most-cited cases in Federal Indian Law. 13  
 
                                                
11 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams, Jr. (2005), 63-71. 
12 See, for instance, Brian E. Brown, Religion, Law, and the Land – Native Americans and the 
Judicial Interpretation of Sacred Land (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 119-170. 
13 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “Top 25 Most-Used and Most Cited Indian Law Supreme Court 
Cases,” Turtle Talk, August 9 2011, http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/08/09/top-25-most-
used-and-most-cited-indian-law-supreme-court-cases/ (accessed October 17, 2011). 
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To the public, the field of law is often perceived as a relatively objective arena, where 
neutrality, facts, and fairness are given considerable weight. In a country as multicultural as 
the United States it is vital that the courts represent all citizens and do not favor one ethnic 
group or class above the others. Yet, it is too easy with this perception to reify the court; to 
look at the law as a ‘thing’ itself, separated from the people who make it, who interpret it, and 
who must abide by it. Likewise, it is too easy to separate the law from the historical 
circumstances that formed this body, and the cultural and societal relations of those in charge 
of representing it. My aim is therefore to highlight the American court system as an arena that 
despite serving all the different ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in the United States, still 
makes comparisons and evaluations which place different worldviews in different, and thus 
sometimes unequal, positions. Although the nine justices of the Supreme Court are agents of a 
larger body of law, they are active in seeking out their interpretations of it, necessitating one 
worldview above another. This becomes especially tangible when presented with cases of 
Indian Law, and where some of the actors in the courtroom not only differ in religious beliefs, 
but also in cultural and societal, creating a divide much larger to overcome on both parts.  
 
It has led to a large number of scholarly works produced on Lyng. Much has been said of the 
case as it pertains to other court decisions on religious freedom.14 One might ask if there is a 
fresh angle to be found on the topic. At the same time, because of its importance there are 
numerous ways to analyze and further examine how Lyng came to be and what came out of it. 
Here I believe my scholarly background of multidisciplinary foci can help me create a space 
for writing on the topic which has not yet been covered. Although my main discussion centers 
on a legal case and the role of law, my experiences in anthropology and history will help me 
look at the subject from different perspectives and create a larger context for the role of law in 
Native America. This being a thesis of an interdisciplinary student, my approach will thus 
combine elements of several academic teachings to provide a broader context of Native 
American religion in the law. Moreover, this project is an indigenous one, not in its author but 
both its theoretical background but its empirical focus. 
 
                                                
14 See, for instance, Brown (1999), Susan Staiger Gooding, “At the Boundaries of Religious 
Identity: Native American Religions and American Legal Culture,” in Numen, vol. 43, no. 2 
(1996).   
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1.4 Research Questions 
Using the Supreme Court decision as my starting point, I am then able to investigate a number 
of relating issues, yet still tie them together under the umbrella of colonization, the role of 
law, and indigenous worldviews. My overarching research question is as follows:  
 
Is there a space for Native American agency and decolonization in the field of law? 
 
In order to answer this question more precisely, I have some subordinated questions as well, 
which are:  
 
How does the Lyng Supreme Court decision fit into the body of Federal Indian Law? 
How do issues of power and difference play out in the courtroom? 
How did the outcome of Lyng affect the narrative indigenous rights in the United 
States? 
What does Lyng say about the postcolonial landscape of American legality? 
 
These questions will hopefully allow me to draw my material together into a succinct analysis 
of the case and of the larger issues surrounding it. My ultimate goal is to bring the discussion 
to a conclusion on where Native Americans stand as subjects of U.S. law. The three 
underlying questions would guide me to such a point. The first, by placing Lyng in a larger 
context, will allow me to show my readers its historical connections and contemporary 
standing. The second question will bring up a discussion of how Native American issues are 
argued in a courtroom, and how indigeneity plays a vital role in the outcome of a decision 
such as Lyng. This will lead into a search for the consequences of it, which will be guided by 
my third question on subsequent events and processes. Here I will attempt at highlighting the 
road after Lyng, taken by both Native activists and the court. This will finally lead me to my 
last question on the role of postcoloniality in U.S. law, which can be answered by combining 
all the previous information gathered into an analysis on the relationship between Native 




1.5 Highlighting the theoretical tools and concepts 
1.5.1 Postcolonial Theory 
The overarching theory at play here is that of postcoloniality, of looking at indigenous 
perspectives in a context that emphasize and critique the colonial heritage.15 This theory, 
originally of a literary focus, has spanned to be included in many various disciplines that are 
concerned with the modern-day experiences of colonized peoples. A core of this theory is the 
attempt to find new modes of analysis and expression removed from the structures and ideas 
based in Western academia.16 It might be a paradox, then, this project’s attempt at describing 
an indigenous issue from an analytical perspective fully founded on scientific methods and 
theories. Indigenous scholars occupied with postcolonial theory have problematized this 
aspect as well.17 Jace Weaver laments that ‘the postcolonial moment” has not arrived as long 
as indigenous peoples are denied their sovereignty, and Elizabeth Cook-Lyn critiques the 
discipline of Native American studies for failing to escape its colonial structures.18 On the 
other hand the last author also emphasizes how important it is to study indigeneity and 
sovereignty in academia.19 
 
There are obvious problems and paradoxes inherent in the theory of postcolonial thinking, 
and my positioning in this field, as a student of Western academia, needs to be questioned. 
Yet, there are valuable strains of thinking stemming from this discourse on the aftermath of 
colonialism. If bearing in mind its pitfalls, it can be useful to employ postcolonial ideas that 
bring to light just how much knowledge production is influenced by scientific, positivistic 
ideals born out of a colonial heritage. As such, a postcolonial framing of the Native American 
rights narrative can provide new aspects on the role of law and legal texts in indigenous lives. 
  
                                                
15 Anna Green and Kathleen Troup, The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-
Century History and Theory (Manchester University Press, 1999), chapter 11.  
16 Green and Troup (1999), 283.  
17 Jace Weaver, “Indigenousness and Indigeneity,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, 
ed. Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000), ch. 10.  
18 Weaver, 233; Elizabeth Cook-Lyn, “Who Stole Native American Studies,” in Wicazo Sa 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1997), 25, 
http://www4.uwm.edu/letsci/ais/pdf/whostole_cooklynn.pdf (accessed Nov 1, 2011)  
19 Cook-Lyn (1997), 21.  
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1.5.2 Important concepts 
The notion of ‘knowledge’ is an important one when talking about how different peoples 
view the world. Coming back to postcolonial thinking, via Orientalism, Stuart Hall details the 
dichotomies created by European imperialism.20 His notion of the center versus the periphery 
is an important tool for exposing ‘the other’ as a Western construction. Moreover, a 
postcolonial interpretation of the subject at hand puts much emphasis on the role of 
knowledge in both upholding and dismantling power. This ties together with this project’s 
tackling of knowledge. I wish to deconstruct the kind of knowledge embedded in Anglo-
American legal thinking, as well as how this is in opposition to indigenous presentations and 
representations of knowledge. In indigenous-to-majority relations this often turns into a 
question of legitimacy and power: who is vested with the authority to determine valuable 
information? How is some forms or pieces of knowledge considered legitimate and others 
not?  
 
I also intend to employ “agency” as a social motive. Sherry B. Ortner writes of practice 
theory, a strain of anthropological thinking that tries to bridge the structures of society with 
the actions of the individuals.21 Semantically speaking, agency embodies the human ability to 
be in control of one’s behavior and intentions and act on them. Although an individual trait, 
agency is formed by cultural and societal interactions as well. These relations bring with them 
issues of power and inequality, and these elements play out when social actors carry out their 
agency.22 Bringing this back to my case study, agency is important as a concept for examining 
how Native Americans make use of their active social roles to participate and shape legal 
discourses. If keeping in mind that when different social actors are brought to a project – such 
as a legal proceeding –, each individual’s role will be determined by some larger societal 
structures. The level of mastering a discourse is dependant upon knowledge of the formal 
rules and norms present in the court. The question I wish to find an answer to is what kind of 
agency Native Americans act out in a legal setting such as the ‘Lyng’ case, and what kinds of 
power relations exists between themselves and their (juridical) opponents.  
 
                                                
20 Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,” in Modernity: An Introduction 
to Modern Societies, eds. S. Hall, D. Held, D. Hubert, and K. Thompson (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996).  
21 Sherry B. Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and the Acting Subject 
(London: Duke University Press, 2006).  
22 Ortner, 130-131. 
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1.5.3 An introduction to basic terms 
The Yurok, the Karok, and the Tolowa people of Northern California have distinct names for 
their tribes. For instance, Yurok means … For non-native people, however, the Yurok are 
more likely to be called “Native Americans,” “American Indians,” simply “Indians,” or in 
some unfortunate cases “red Indians.” The Yurok identify themselves as ‘Olekwo’l,’ meaning 
“Persons.” The state of California and the United States government identify them as the 
Yurok Tribe, a federally recognized American Indian tribe. The general, international public 
might name them “Indigenous Peoples.” How to address members of the Yurok, or other 
American Indian tribes, is an important question. It has been subject to much debate in the 
Untied States, as an important part of the general discourse on Native American issues. The 
most common term, Indian, has its origin in the European arrogance of Christopher 
Columbus, who believed he had reached India when he met the indigenous people on the 
American continent. As such, the name and its legacy have come to symbolize the colonial 
history between Europeans and Native Americans.  
 
“Indian” is much more than a factual description of a people. It carries immense connotations, 
subject to changes in historical moods and political climates. Most often it has been used 
derogatory, in signaling the vast difference between, and inferiority to, the European settlers. 
As such, many feel that the term should be abandoned. On the other hand, many Natives see 
the benefit of reclaiming the word as a way of taking control of a discourse so heavily created 
by and for non-Natives. For the past half-century or so, the term “Native American” has been 
most commonly used. It has its disadvantages as well, since some U.S. citizens feel they 
ought to be able to call themselves the same, as natives to the country. However, this is such a 
widespread term that I feel confident in employing it without great offense.23 Using “Indian” 
leads me to shakier ground, since I am not a native person reclaiming the word. On the other 
hand, in much of the material discussed throughout this thesis, the term is used widely. Legal 
matters pertaining to the tribes fall under the umbrella category of Federal Indian Law and 
therefore the term is often used, always with a capital “I.” When discussing a specific people, 
I find it best to employ the names they have given themselves, or at least are known as 
officially. Moreover, I will vary between denoting their groupings as “tribes” or “nations.” 
                                                
23 Walter C. Fleming’s The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Native American History (Indianapolis, 
IN: Alpha Books, 2003) has a great basic discussion of the various names, in chapter 1; also, 
Clara Sue Kidwell, Homer Noley, and George E. “Tink” Tinker, A Native American Theology 
(New York: Orbis Books, 2001), xi.  
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The latter term has risen in popularity lately. It is often associated with politically independent 
areas and groups, and many tribes feel that it better signals the self-determination they are 
trying to achieve.  
 
It is also important to mention some of the terms I will use when discussing non-Native 
people of the United States. In contemporary matters they are simply Americans, or U.S. 
citizens. However, in the context of this thesis it is important to denote their background when 
discussing historical issues. Their cultural, social, and political background has their origins 
too, and it is vital to equalize the differences between, for instance, Yurok and British cultural 
traditions. While “Euro-American” is one of the most common names, I will often denote 
legal matters as of “Anglo-American” origin, as much of the U.S. legal system is based on 
British common law. When addressing religious matters, it is somewhat insufficient to label 
the majority views as Judeo-Christian; however, it is done here for sake of space. Likewise, 
Native American religions is a term with many lacking and generalizing attributes, however, 
this will be discussed more extensively in chapter 3, as it is an important part of the religious 
rights discourse in the Untied States.  
 
1.6 Methodological points and ethical concerns 
As readers have probably discovered by now, this project is largely based on analysis of 
written documents. During the research process, some interviews were conducted with tribal 
members from Western Montana. The ‘Lyng’ case itself was not mentioned, but in all of my 
interviews we discussed general concerns of the tribes on the protection of knowledge, on 
religious freedom, and on tribal integrity. These conversations have shaped the process of the 
thesis, and my thinking process. However, as the nature of the thesis has changed since its 
initial design, I will not apply the interviews.  
 
My analysis will be purely qualitative and based on written research. Primary sources include 
the official court documents of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 
and interviews and news articles relaying its information. The secondary sources consist of 
scholarly and activist books, articles and opinions on the ‘Lyng’ case itself and on issues 
relating to the discourse on indigeneity and religious freedom in the United States. In 
choosing my material I have strived to be selective. First and foremost I am required to rely 
on a number of sources written by legal institution, such as official court documents. 
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However, I have tried to supplement these with as many indigenous scholars as possible. I do 
think it is a highly necessary and valuable determination as a student of Indigenous Studies. 
 
The analysis of a legal case follow a certain pattern, and I have used this outline as a skeleton 
but fleshed out the analysis by adding information other than the legal text, or other case law, 
itself. This method, called “briefing” is structured as such:24 
1. Identification of the case: with its full name and citation. 
2. The facts of the case: the origins of the dispute and the arguments of both the plaintiff 
and the defendant. Here, one can also include any relevant decisions made by a lower 
court. 
3. The issue at hand: the central matter of the dispute, in the form of a question before 
the court. 
4. The decision: whether the court answered this question “yes” or “no.”  
5. The reasoning: how the court came to its conclusion, and possibly what statutory law 
or precedents it relied on.  
Since my thesis is not strictly a legal brief, or even a legal analysis, I will not follow this to a 
tee. Yet, such an outline is helpful in singling out the most important facts of a complex issue 
and structuring them in comprehensible manner.  
 
I have briefly touched upon the issue of integrity in relation to informants, but there are some 
other ethical concerns that need to be addressed as well. When conducting my interviews with 
the tribal members, I openly stated my interest in the topic, the reasons why, and my concerns 
with being a non-indigenous person writing about indigenous topics and peoples. I always try 
to be aware of my role as an outsider in this context. I have a genuine interest in and passion 
for the topics I am discussing, and I do wish to present them with the integrity they deserve. 
Despite this, there is no denying that I am a European; a Westerner; a white person whose 
upbringing and educational background is grounded in a culture that differs from that of many 
indigenous experiences. I can advocate for postcolonial thinking and indigenous 
methodologies, but I cannot write as an indigenous person. My analysis will necessarily be 
informed by the scientific ideals of Western academia. Yet I hope that by keeping an honest 
                                                
24 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams, Jr. (2005), chapter 1; “How to Brief Cases and Analyze 
Case Problems,” Cengage Learning 
http://academic.cengage.com/resource_uploads/downloads/0324654553_91282.pdf (accessed 
June 10, 2012).  
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and open outlook I will still be able to provide a valuable contribution to these issues. My aim 
is to present these topics fairly, honestly, and concretely. Although I wish to add something to 
the general discussion of legal cultures and indigeneity, I realize that I have limited time, 
space, and knowledge to do so.  
 
I am a non-indigenous person. Moreover, I grew up in and got my education in one of the 
richest welfare-societies in the world. If I were not aware of my privileged background before 
entering this field of study I certainly am now. As such, this thesis has opened my eyes not 
only to the world of law and spirituality and of postcolonial discourses. My position as an 
academic student, from and in a Western, European country is revealed by the manner in 
which I pose questions, by how I relate to differing worldviews and beliefs, and by how I 
present and represent those involved in this narrative. My cultural, political and religious 
points of views will necessarily play a part in the way I situate myself. On the other hand, for 
all my difference from the indigenous peoples whose story I will relay, there are many 
similarities as well, and especially one in particular I wish to mention.  
 
I grew up on a farm. I lived there until I was 18, and have since then spent most of my 
summers, Christmases, and other holidays there. My dad runs it, as his dad did before him, 
and his dad again before that. In fact, I belong to the nineteenth generation living on this piece 
of land. I could say property, but that would not cover what this place is or what it means to 
me. I know that girls like me have walked the same paths as I have one hundred years ago. I 
know that men like my father have harvested corn on the same acres four hundred years ago. 
To me, imagining these daily events signifies the connection to my ancestors, my heritage, in 
a way I know many others cannot experience. However, reading and hearing Native people 
speak of their forefathers and their land that has always been there under their feet, I see my 
story and myself. I see my passion for my home place and my connection to the land my 
family has lived and breathed on for centuries. I find that I can channel some of that passion 
and spirit into this thesis, and know that although I am far removed from their stories there are 
still values which we all hold sacred.  
 
It is not my wish nor goal to achieve total objectivity or neutrality, by presenting both sides of 
the argument and leaving the reader to decide for him or herself which story they believe. My 
goal is to convince my readers that what I have to say has truth. However, it is my truth and 
no one else’s. It is up to the reader to ascertain whether the narrative I present is backed by 
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facts and arguments which compel them to feel something for the story. Whether that is 
anger, frustration, sympathy, or apathy is up to you but I hope that what I am about to present 
will make a contribution. 
 
1.7 A chapter outline 
Having thus outlined the scope and purpose of my thesis, I will turn to the thick descriptions 
of my research material and analyses. The second chapter is devoted to the overarching 
theories I will employ throughout this text. I will start with a discussion on the origins of 
postcolonial theory and present some of the criticism raised against it. Then I will include 
notions of indigeneity as it relates to the postcolonial project and briefly discuss how it can be 
of purpose when addressing Native American issues. I will also draw some connections to the 
role of law in such a context. The second half of this chapter concerns itself with Federal 
Indian Law, both as a theory and historical process. As such, I will spend some time outlining 
the founding principles, which informs this body of knowledge, and then give a quick 
overview of the role of law throughout U.S. history, as it pertains to Native Americans.  
 
This should set the stage for the next chapter, in which I will go into the historical and legal 
contexts more in depth. Chapter 3 will provide the reader with more extensive knowledge of 
Native Americans as a legal entity within the nation-state. Although there is no room for a full 
historical analysis, it is vital to the understanding of Federal Indian Law that the reader is 
aware of some of historical and contemporary conditions for the case study. Therefore this 
chapter also includes a discussion of the religious views of both Native Americans and a 
mainstream America. This is an important aspect of the project, and as much detail as 
necessary yet relevant is outlined, but for the sake of space there has been made some 
generalizations on both sides. However, the nuances will hopefully remain clear. Finally, the 
chapter tackles the case study itself – the Supreme Court decision called Lyng, and details its 
initial circumstances as well as the journey through the legal system.  
 
The fourth chapter will dive into an analysis of the Lyng case and discuss at length all the 
aspects of the decision. This includes an evaluation of the logic employed by the court, and 
the kinds of precedents it relied on. Moreover, it will examine the dissenting opinion and how 
it creates a contrast to the majority. The chapter will also place much weight on an extensive 
interpretation of the language used by the court. By looking at themes such as difference, the 
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role of the sacred, authority, and notions of land, we can place the legal decision within the 
framework of postcolonial thinking.  
 
After this I will move on to the fifth chapter, which although also providing analysis, will 
rather consider some longer lines of judicial treatment of religious rights. By employing the 
material presented in the preceding chapters I will supply some much needed context for Lyng 
so as to place it within the framework of both Federal Indian Law and a legal rights narrative. 
It will then turn to the relationship between Native Americans and the courts, and look at 
some of the developments taking place after the 1988 Supreme Court decision. The chapter 
will conclude with a discussion on the current status of a postcolonial tribal rights narrative.  
 
Finally, I will end the thesis with a short chapter in order to provide the reader with some 
conclusive remarks. It will provide a space for reflections on the thesis itself and seek to draw 
the different themes and analysis made throughout this text together. As such, it can provide a 
complete narrative for the reader.   
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Chapter 2: A theoretical approach to Lyng; overarching theories 
and histories.  
 
Before I start my analysis of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, it is 
important to shed some light on the theoretical aspects of the thesis and how they will service 
this case study. I derive my more abstract material from two academic fields and will seek to 
combine them in the analysis for the purpose of giving my empirical examples weight and 
context. The first I will present is Postcolonial Theory, as briefly introduced in the previous 
chapter. I will discuss some basic foundation blocks as well as problematic points and then 
give a thicker description of the field as it pertains to indigenous issues. This will hopefully 
give the reader an understanding of its relevance to my exact topic. In the second half of this 
chapter I will move onto a discussion on the merits of Federal Indian Law. This body of 
theories is the umbrella under which a legal case such as Lyng falls, and it is important to 
provide the reader with knowledge of the field’s roots, principles, and usage. The demarcation 
of Federal Indian Law, as well as postcolonial theory, will hopefully provide a sufficient 
framework for the case study and bring them together in a harmonious contribution to the 
abstract levels of this thesis. 
 
2.1 Postcolonial Theory 
2.1.1 Overview of theoretical field 
Postcolonial theory concerns itself with the effects of colonization, to put it shortly. The 
‘post’ does not imply that our contemporary society is freed from the force of it. Rather, 
because the period of physical European occupation of foreign nations is mostly over, a new 
paradigm of analysis and critical thought is opening up in “the colonial aftermath.”25 
Although political and economic upheaval have dominated this period, postcolonial theory 
concerns itself mostly with a critique of Western ideas, ideologies, and knowledge, and the 
ways in which these have claimed a narrative over the subjugated colonies.  
 
                                                
25 Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998), 5. 
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Such strains of thought can be traced back to the poststructuralist climate of the 1970s. 
Edward Said’s notion of the West and the ‘Other’ in his publication “Orientalism” in 1978 is 
often considered a pillar of postcolonial theory.26 He was joined by philosophers, physiatrists, 
and other theoretical thinkers in creating new literary works on the experiences of 
colonization. The development of the new theory followed in the wake of decolonization 
efforts by populations throughout the world rebelling against their former oppressors. Parts of 
this surge of literary prose came from authors standing in the middle of these battles.27 They 
were able to draw attention to those struggling to free themselves from subjugation. However, 
it is important to note that postcolonial theory found its institutional footing in the previous 
imperial states such as Great Britain and the United States.28 This implicates the focus of the 
theory as one that strives to free First World nations and discourses of their colonial legacies 
– an often-problematic endeavor, which I will return to below. 
 
What Said did for the postcolonial project should nevertheless not be diminished. By pointing 
out the hierarchical structure of knowledge production, he was able to demonstrate the 
importance of the ideological motive for and support of Western dominance. Power is not 
only found in military strength or control of resources but in how a society is informed to 
think of others, and how they are presented, or represented, to the society.29 In other words, 
there exists a colonial, or Oriental, discourse; a system of meaning wherein the ruling 
European class have established the perceptions of themselves and their colonized people, and 
of the relation between these two, which dominates above others. The charge Said made 
against this authority thus implicated Western academia and its role in upholding control 
through theoretical writing. Knowledge becomes embedded with such powers to the point 
that, according to Said, “European knowledge is colonialism.”30  
 
The postcolonial project is an attempt at deconstructing this knowledge system wherein the 
voices of colonized peoples are reduced to images of representations formed by Western 
                                                
26 Gandhi (1998), 23-25. 
27 Gandhi (1998), 6 (on Albert Memmi). 
28 Jenny Sharpe, “Postcolonial Studies in the House of US Multiculturalism,” in A Companion 
to Postcolonial Studies, ed.s Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000), 113-114.  
29 Gandhi (1998), 64-65, 74. 
30 Henry Schwartz, “Mission Impossible: Introducing Postcolonial Studies in the US 
Academy,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, ed.s Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 4. 
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mindscapes. This deconstruction, however, is a complex task beyond the goal of reversing the 
hierarchies of power. First of all it is twofold in that it seeks to dismantle the seemingly 
scientific and positivistic composition of Western knowledge systems, and to lift up those 
systems often referred to as “subjugated knowledges.” 31 Second, there are those who claim 
that colonialist influences cannot be shed, and that the project of postcolonial theory is to 
recover from past atrocities through remembrance. Although many might wish for a clean 
break with colonial traditions and a pure reversal of power, it is necessary for moving forward 
that the historical impact be given (new) light. One can compare it to that of recovery from a 
traumatic event, by which those affected need to come to terms with what has happened and 
how their lives will always be informed by it. That is of course not to say that those affected 
will be so forever, but rather that it is utopian to believe that a simple refusal to speak of the 
past again will erase it.  
 
2.1.2 Indigeneity and postcolonial theory 
If we look at the experiences of Native Americans, many of the postcolonial goals apply to 
their histories. Since the arrival of Columbus in 1492, they have been subjugated physically, 
physiologically, and emotionally to the authority of others. Although indigenous to the land, 
the long-term military dominance of the European conquerors enabled an inversion, by which 
the indigenous became the Other. As such, there is a long and excruciating history in the 
United States of colonial ideas and images of the Indian. “Barbarians,” “uncivilized,” and 
“savages” were common descriptors of the population of the Americas in the early days of 
colonization.32 These creations have proved difficult to erase and have gone from building 
knowledge to defining it. Part of the decolonization project for Native Americans lies then in 
exposing these racist terms for what they are – constructions – and strive to demand the 
power to define themselves.  
 
Such a task is made the more difficult by the unique structure of the United States as a former 
colony. As opposed to, for example, India, where the British were eventually forced out, the 
colonial conquerors of Native Americans never left. That is of course one of the defining 
characteristics of indigenous peoples: a population or several who continue to live under the 
rule of a foreign power, despite defining themselves as sovereign before and during such a 
                                                
31 Gandhi (1998), 52-53. 
32 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams, Jr. (2005), 48-51. 
 18 
reign.33 This power dynamic is often called “internal colonization,” describing the 
marginalization of a minority by the dominant group. However, in the United States it also 
denotes the experiences of immigrants, who take up a large portion of the multicultural 
nation-state. It is important to the integrity of the postcolonial project to account for “uneven 
historical formations and dispersed geographical locals, ” including immigrants and minority 
groups.34  
 
Nevertheless, the extraordinary conditions making up an indigenous group, such as Native 
Americans, has created unique histories that give them a space in the discourse of their own. 
Here, the “post” part of postcolonialism becomes vital. For indigenous peoples in settler 
states, it is difficult to discuss the effects of Western imperialism on their societies as 
reflections of the past. Those with authority to define and rule still benefit from the colonial 
past, and they bring this privilege into their contemporary narratives.35 The U.S. courts 
provide a telling example. The institutions are based on European customs and rules, 
established at a point in history when Native Americans were legally defined as “savages.” 
Yet, they continue to make use of language stemming from such a worldview, despite the 
epoch of origin.   
 
2.1.3 The problematic nature of postcolonial theory 
The contemporary situation of settler nations such as the United States reveals itself open to 
postcolonial discussion. Especially for Native Americans, there is much to be said for the 
dynamics of settler-indigenous in a country where the ruling elite still benefits from 
colonialism. Yet, critics of postcolonialism charge that the academic discourse on these issues 
are still permeated by Western-based ideas and notions. Elizabeth Cook-Lyn offers a critique 
of the development of Native American studies as a scholarly pursuit, for its failure to 
revolutionize perceptions of indigenous peoples in the United States.36 According to her, this 
                                                
33 Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai, and Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Peoples and the Law – 
Historical, Comparative and Contextual Issues,” in Indigenous Peoples and the Law: 
Comparative and Critical Perspectives, ed.s Richardson, Imai, and McNeil (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009), 13. 
34 Sharpe (2000), 118. 
35 Jace Weaver, “Indigenousness and Indigeneity,” in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, 
ed.s Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 223. 
36 Elizabeth Cook-Lyn, “Who Stole Native American Studies,” in Wicazo Sa Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1997), 25.  
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stems from a lack of Native scholars in the field, or rather the ability of Native scholars and 
intellectuals to establish their own discourse.  
 
This assessment is in accordance with much of what has been said of postcolonial theory on a 
grander scale. Because it concerns itself mostly with a critique of Western knowledge, of 
Western academia, and of Western intellectual history, it can consequently be viewed as a 
discipline made for intellectuals, seeking to distance themselves from their predecessors. 
Therein lies the contradiction of Western academia, which seeks to denounce its imperial 
history and bring marginalized voices into the field by means of a theory developed by and 
for academics. Commentators point out the distance between those writing about topics of 
postcolonialism and those ‘acting’ it out. There is, in other words, still a gap between author 
and subject. Postcolonial theory is born out of Western, academic discourses, which continue 
to uphold authoritative positions in the world of academia.37 This place of centrality is often 
in contrast with the lives led by the objects of the pursuit, signifying that people continue to 
live on the margins of society, as well as of academic, or intellectual, power. 
 
Such criticism is important to highlight, although it might appear to give the theory a lethal 
blow. A few point are then important to counter with. First of all, this criticism overlooks all 
the voices coming from “subjugated” knowledges that have contributed to the creation and 
development of postcolonial theory. It was Edward Said, a Palestinian-American, who created 
its catalyst. Other defining figures include Gayatri Spivak, an Indian professor, who coined 
some of the most important terms and continues to challenge the internal structures of the 
field.38 But founding figures aside, numerous of writers and scholars from decolonized 
nations have contributed to postcolonial theories, signaling that the vitality of the project is 
dependant upon such diversity. Second, denouncing postcolonial projects as simply Western 
and therefore of no value to decolonization efforts, is to overlook another aspect of its own 
beginnings. The project came about precisely to expose academic knowledge production as a 
construct, and more specifically, the writing of colonial times as a tool of oppression and 
authority. By doing so, postcolonial discussions are not only producing new forms of 
knowledge but also new tools for exposing truths and establishments as constructed 
worldviews, with roots in discriminatory beliefs and ideas. 
 
                                                
37 Gandhi (1998), 55. 
38 Gandhi (1998), 43, 55.  
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In indigenous circles there are those who wish to forgo all traces of Western-based 
approaches in creating and communicating knowledge.  Dynamics and rules of academia 
must be discarded for a peoples’ own customs and methods. Critics coming from a Native 
American point of view lament the failure of their own academic field to support the long-
term goals of the people, namely sovereignty. True self-determination is impossible as long as 
the tribes are educated by and for a system with origins in their oppression.39 On the other 
hand, the reality of the situation makes it difficult to implement such a radical break. As 
Native Americans are still fighting for their right to dictate the terms of their status in the U.S. 
(legal and otherwise), postcolonial theory “represents a response to a genuine need.”40 It can 
thus be employed by Native activists, intellectuals, and academics, to expose Western 
worldviews and knowledge hierarchies and find new ways of addressing their own. Beyond 
this diversity, it seems necessary that in order to keep postcolonial discourses ‘in line’ it is 
important that those writing in the field dare to oppose the Western institutions home to 
colonial narratives. This often becomes a challenge centered on questions of loyalty, integrity, 
and co-option. Gandhi emphasizes the political involvement of academics in this context and 
the need for postcolonial intellectuals who dare act against academic institutions and build 
bridges between those and peoples involved in decolonization efforts.41 
 
2.1.4 Postcoloniality and the law 
Although not a main goal of postcolonial theory, the law is nonetheless an interesting heir to 
the colonial heritage and worthy subject of study. The origins of U.S. legal theory will be 
more thoroughly described underneath, but some context is useful to provide here. The 
uniqueness of indigenous groups lies with the forms of occupation. Colonies of settlement are 
defined by a long-term presence of a European, dominant community and the subjugation and 
removal of the people indigenous to the land. The subversion from majority to minority was 
an important part of the colonial project in addition to making the settlers “native” to the area 
so as to legitimize their occupation of land already inhabited. The construction of “terra 
nullius” was such a myth, created to stimulate the notion that the indigenous did not in fact 
occupy the land. The “terra,” or earth, was empty. The claim was necessary, for neither the 
Americas nor Australia was invaded by full military force. “Empty land can be settled, but 
                                                
39 Weaver (2000), 227-232; Cook-Lyn (1997), 19. 
40 Dirlik, quoted in Weaver (2000), 222. 
41 Gandhi (1998), 58-59, 63. 
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occupied land can only be invaded.”42 The colonizers claimed the land they settled was 
uncultivated and without use, thereby justifying the “simple” takeover and displacement of 
the indigenous peoples.   
 
However, this conflicting status of the colonial project in settler-states meant that the various 
indigenous groups were neither military invaded or conquered, nor where they accepted or 
assimilated into the new, European-derived societies. They continued to denote an anomalous 
legal status as the colonial powers carried out policies of armed conflicts and displacement of 
land along while simultaneously they signed treaties and respected some inherent rights of the 
indigenous population. Although their presence became a growing problem against rising 
immigration, the native peoples were given some prerogatives from the start, such as (narrow) 
rights to occupy their land. Their inclusion into the legal discourse meant onwards they could 
not be ignored. However, the law could be used as a tool to suppress narrative that challenges 
the legitimacy of the American conquest. As such, the judiciary becomes a dangerous space 
for the indigenous, since the control of lies entirely in the hands of their colonizers.43 
 
Moreover, Native Americans have for most of post-contact history been subjected to the 
definitions of others. As such, the legitimacy of their own beliefs and practices has always 
been dependant upon recognition by their colonial oppressors. One road to decolonization is 
therefore the disruption of majority authority. For most indigenous populations in settler-
colonies, the physical and intellectual control over land and property has been one of the areas 
with the most conflict. In many ways, rights to land is inherent in the right to govern oneself, 
and one that is especially vital for groups still residing on their historical land, but as member 
of a nation in which the colonizers still reside and control. As opposed to former colonies on 
the African and Asian continent, resistance and reforms has not been possible for indigenous 
peoples in settler-colonies. There, decolonization of physical, spiritual, and legal property has 
to take place in a space still dominated by European, colonial histories, although modernized. 
The challenge for Native Americans and other indigenous groups alike is therefore to achieve 
self-determination and separate from the colonial traditions of the legal field.  
 
                                                
42 Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson, “Settler Colonies,” in A Companion to Postcolonial 
Studies, ed.s Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 364. 
43 Robert A. Williams, Jr., “Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European 
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law,” in Arizona Law 
Review, vol. 31 (1989), http://heinonline.org (Accessed March 9, 2012), 261. 
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2.2 Federal Indian Law 
The anomalous status of indigenous peoples has, as briefly described above, led to a special 
development of legal texts and practices, unique to each settler-nation with a colonized, 
indigenous population. In the United States this vast historical and thematical collection is 
called Federal Indian Law. It provides the theoretical basis for discussing any aspect of Native 
Americans and their participation in the courtroom or in other judicial spaces. In order to 
understand the complex circumstances of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association, this part of the chapter will provide the reader with some basic knowledge of the 
legal field in which Native Americans are placed and in which they must operate. Federal 
Indian Law is at its core a body of legal documents and cases that all make up the legal rights 
of Native tribes in the United States.  
 
2.2.1 Where does Federal Indian Law come from? 
Although some of the legal justification for the colonization of the New World has been 
discussed above, I would like to add a few details to broaden the specific context of the 
United States. Much of the Federal Indian Law body is based on common law, which in turn 
is derived from customs and judicial precedents. The origins of U.S. common law as it 
pertains to Native Americans can be traced as far back the Middle Ages. The legal status of 
non-European peoples had occupied the minds of European intellectuals since the Crusades. 
The debate concerned what kinds of justifications existed for European nations to invade and 
subjugate other nations. Most found their reasoning in the “natural law,” which deemed 
Christianity a rightful cause for conquest of heathens.44 The argument of civilization and 
subjugation of non-Christian peoples carried on into the era of discovery in the fifteenth 
century. Moreover, it gave way to legal principles amongst the European nations as well, the 
Law of Nations.45 This law dictated the right of the discovering nation against others as 
absolute, derived from nature, i.e. the natural conditions under the Christian God.  
 
The colonial period in what was to become the United States (and Canada) presents an 
interesting contradiction. On the one hand, British settlers had to justify taking land already 
occupied and inhabited by Native American tribes. Many employed the Christianity argument 
as reasoning for settling the continent. In addition, the puritans failed to recognize any 
                                                
44 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams, Jr. (2005), 42-46. 
45 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams, Jr. (2005), 48. 
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societal structures among the tribes, especially since the natural state of the lands they lived 
on was seen as a pre-modern form of living.46 On the other hand, throughout the first wave of 
British settlement, many of the Eastern tribes were numerous and military strong. Through 
centuries of habitation, they held immense knowledge of the land and resources and therefore 
made valuable trading partners. Despite European notions of their inferiority, the tribes 
became involved in both trades and disputes with some sort of established conduct and 
protocol. By entering into treaties with the British, the tribes built a government-to-
government relationship with the colonial powers that laid the foundation for their legal 
status. According to the tribes, their right to independence and governance was inherent from 
time immemorial. From the colonizers point of view, on the other hand, these rights could 
easily have been ignored all together. However, through the process of treaty making and 
trade, the European settlers put in place a relationship that could not be ignored later on.  
 
After Independence in 1776, the British colonies became free from their Old World 
motherland and established themselves firmly on American soil. They moreover grounded 
their sovereign right as a nation over the landmass, despite the presence of an indigenous 
population already living on much of the land. How to deal with the legal status of Native 
American tribes was a problem exemplified even in the American Constitution. The tribes 
were only mentioned three places in the founding text, which means that from the onset, 
much of the legal principles for dealing with Native American matters had to be derived from 
common law – from customs and legal decisions as opposed to statutory law. Besides being 
mentioned in relation to taxation and the executive’s power of treaty making, the only clause 
legally governing relations between the tribes and the government was the Commerce Clause. 
In article 1, section 8, clause 3, of the Constitution Congress is given the power to regulate 
commerce with the tribes.47 What “commerce” entails has been subject to one of the great 
debates in Federal Indian Law, and still poses questions as to what kinds of powers the tribes 
possess inherently, and what kinds of powers Congress have been charged with by the 
Constitution. 
 
Because the founding document was rather vague on the legal status of the native population, 
much of their rights have been outlined in the courtroom (in addition to statutes and acts). The 
                                                
46 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams (2005), 57-58. 
47 William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law, 4th ed. (St.Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2004), 
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Supreme Court has in particular played a vital role in establishing the scope of Federal Indian 
Law and continues to do so today. However, that governmental institution is not a static or 
neutral body as politics plays an important role in setting the legislative and judicial agenda. 
By setting up a chronological line of events, one sees how the pendulum has swung from 
forces of assimilation to separatism. Moreover, the fate of the tribes is prone to pressure from 
various opposing interests, which contribute to create “uniquely formidable obstacles to the 
development of consistent and unitary legal doctrine.”48 
 
2.2.2 The historical periods of Federal Indian Law and policy  
The colonial period up until the 1820s is also considered the first era dictating Federal Indian 
law and policy, and it was dominated by treaty-making and the Trade and Intercourse Acts of 
1790. These pieces of legislation were meant to separate the tribes from non-Indians by 
establishing boundaries and giving the federal government control of land purchases. The 
second era is often called the removal era and was dominated by conflicting interests between 
and within the three governmental branches on how to deal with “the Indian problem.”49 A 
trio of Supreme Court decisions handed down by Chief Justice John Marshall became 
precedents for some of the most important and well-established principles of Federal Indian 
Law (and will be discussed in detail in chapter 3).50 With meager judicial support for tribal 
rights, President Jackson launched the removal of five Southeastern tribes, now famously 
known as the Trail of Tears.  
 
The removal of tribes further west, into what was then considered unknown and unoccupied 
territory by the newcomers, led to a period of establishing reservations (known historically as 
the reservation era). Through treaties, various tribes ceded some of their land in exchange for 
developments of schools, housing, and protection of the reservation. They had little left to 
bargain with, as their strength diminished and that of the European immigrants grew.51 Tribe 
after tribe signed treaties giving up their ancestral land in favor of areas further west, where 
they supposedly would be alone from white settlement. The American government also hoped 
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these bounded areas would create farmers out of the Native Americans, thereby civilizing the 
tribes and assimilating them successfully into the majority society. These reservations became 
known as “Indian territories.” Because of the extraordinary status of the Indian tribes as legal 
entities, the territories out West developed into areas of (limited) tribal jurisdiction. The tribes 
who moved onto these bounded areas retained some of their governmental powers, and were 
able to assert authority over these lands, which eventually became known as Indian Country – 
a legal description denoting tribal jurisdiction that still operates today.52 
 
The 1870’s and 80’s saw further defeats for tribes, especially in the Northwest, as skirmishes, 
battles, and outright massacres diminished them in number. Military defeats gave way to 
further settlement of the West, which was becoming increasingly attractive due to gold 
mining and the building of transcontinental railways. Moreover, the Congress sought to limit 
the rights of Indians living on reservations and overturned a Supreme Court decision in order 
to seize criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country from the tribal courts. In 1887, Congress 
enacted the General Allotment Act, which individualized ownership of land on the 
reservations. Each piece of land was held in trust by the federal government, and the acres 
“left” after the distribution to all eligible Indians were then opened to the general public for 
purchase.53 This piece of legislation is considered one of the most damaging for Native 
American land rights and the communal way of life. It permeated land policies throughout the 
coming century, creating so-called “checkerboard reservations.”54  
 
The Indian policy era of allotment lasted well into the twentieth century. During this period 
over 90 million acres of Indian territory was lost to non-Indians, and over 65 percent of land 
previously owned by the tribes was taken from them through forced or “surplus” sales.55 
However, terrible conditions for Natives all over the U.S., and on Hawaii, in the early 1900’s 
led to a shift in policy. The period known as Reorganization got its name from the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, or the “Indian New Deal.” It sought to stop the allotment of 
Indian lands, bring them back into Native control, and empower the tribes to manage their 
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affairs and developments themselves.56  The goal was to create and sustain self-governance 
through political organization of the tribes, which would simultaneously diminish the powers 
of administration by the federal government, such as the Interior Department and the Office 
of Indian Affairs.57 Despite this positive shift, many have criticized the act for its Westernized 
outlook. The tribal councils and constitutions to be implemented by the tribes were based on 
Anglo-American forms of government, and not on the specific governance of the tribes 
themselves. The imposition of these institutions from the outside led to much protest within 
the communities as well.58  
 
The historical timeline of Federal Indian Law sways much like a pendulum. As the political 
climate of the USA shifted after the Second World War, so did policies in regards to the 
native population. From the 1950’s to the end of the 1960’s, federal laws and policies were 
aimed at terminating the extraordinary legislative and judicial status held by the tribes. In 
1953, the House of Representatives adopted a policy of termination, which would eliminate 
the shaky yet important government-to-government relationship between the tribes and the 
federal U.S. powers. One of the consequences of this policy was the termination of around 
one hundred tribes, which entailed that their official status as a tribe (with all the rights 
connected to this) was terminated. Moreover, Congress sought to move Natives off the 
reservations while extending civil and criminal jurisdiction of states to Indian Country, which 
previously had been mostly subject to its own, tribal authority.59 
 
However, legislators did not foresee how their actions awakened a fighting spirit among the 
tribes, and organizations sprung up in order to protest the federal acts. Consensus soon grew 
on the termination policies inefficiencies and by the 1960s it had largely been abandoned. A 
new shift was on the rise, born out of the civil rights movement. The era of self-determination 
is the current one to mark federal laws and policies towards the tribes, although there have 
been several shifts within this time period. Nonetheless, the 60’s and 70’s were represented 
by positive developments from both the legislative and executive branches. In 1970, President 
Nixon put self-determination on the agenda with a statement to Congress, for which the 
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Native community praised him.60 Further into the decade, Congress passed a number of acts 
seeking to improve and develop economic and social conditions on the reservations. The 
1990’s also saw a number of laws in which protection of culture and language was the goal.61  
 
Other initiatives sought to increase self-governance for the tribes, by strengthening their tribal 
constitutions and councils as well as their tribal courts. Moreover, laws such as the 1988 
amendment of the Indian Self-Determination Act would help tribes take increasing charge 
over programs previously overseen and administered by non-Indian agencies, for example in 
regards to health services.62 The judicial branch of the government, on the other hand, has 
overall been less then willing to expand or even preserve the self-determination rights of the 
tribes. The Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Rehnquist between 1986 and 2005, known as 
the Rehnquist Court, has gained criticism for curtailing tribal sovereignty and limiting or 
denying cultural protections.63 Whereas the last thirty years have proven positive in legislative 
developments, the courts remain an unstable judge of Indian policy and law. For “even as 
tribes have gained greater political influence, their ability to rely on the Court to insist on 
clear expressions of congressional intent to alter or diminish their rights is being cast into 
doubt.”64 The developments in the judicial branch begs the question for future historians of 
when the era of self-determination will give way to another, and of what kind. 
 
2.2.3 Self-determination 
Throughout the history of the tribal-government relationship, self-determination has been the 
most important goal for Natives to achieve and the government to curtail. Questions of 
sovereignty have permeated the history of Federal Indian Law since there was no definite 
answer to be found in the Constitution. Is the right to self-determination for the tribes 
inherent? Or does Congress, who holds plenary power over the Native Americans, give it to 
them? Despite being subjected to two hundred years of judicial review, these questions are 
still not finitely answered. Consequently, self-determination as a realistic goal for Natives is 
often dependant upon the pendulum of policies and decisions of the courts. In his third trilogy 
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case, Marshall laid the groundwork for this debate by acknowledging the “natural rights” of 
the Indians “as undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”65  
 
However, there is a competing view that the powers of Congress over the tribes are plenary in 
the sense that they are all compassing, instead of retaining only those granted by law. The 
difference lies in the distinction between a hierarchy of governmental powers and an absolute 
right of power. The latter interpretation has led to some of the most devastating policies and 
legal opinions for the tribes. It has afforded the Congress with justification for terminating 
treaties with tribes, as well as even denying tribes their status as tribes by eliminating all the 
rights such a status gives the tribes, as well as individual members of them. I will provide 
some examples of these debates in the following chapter but for now it is vital to emphasize 
how the dependency of the self-determination project lies with the federal government, and 
thus is continuously subject to the political climate of legislators and judiciaries.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The federal government has a large hold over the rights of Native Americans. A historical 
overview as the one detailed above, displays the authoritative position of the legislature and 
(especially) the Supreme Court in setting the rights agenda for the country’s indigenous 
population. As the political climate of the nation has shifted back and forth between liberal 
and conservative outlooks, so has the legal standing of the tribes been subject to such review. 
The body of knowledge known as Federal Indian Law holds the information necessary to both 
examine the history of tribal status but also get a feel of the role of the Indian in the legal 
discourse. It allows us to provide context to the other theory discussed in this chapter – 
postcoloniality. The project of deconstructing the ideas and narratives of Western intellectual 
superiority opens up a discourse on contemporary indigeneity. Despite some concerns with 
how the theory originated, postcolonial ideas are of value to Native American decolonization 
efforts. Moreover, they provide a framework for discussing notions of power and knowledge 
in a hierarchical, Western-based system such as United States law.  
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Chapter 3 – The American courtroom as a meeting point for 
Federal Indian Law policies and religious rights.  
Following the last chapter’s framing of this thesis theoretical focus, I will now present the 
case study fully. First of all this chapter will provide the reader with an in-depth discussion on 
both the legal and historical circumstances for the Supreme Court decision. I will place the 
Lyng case both within the landscape of Federal Indian Law and the historical context of 
Native American rights. Thereafter, I will go into the court proceedings themselves and trace 
the history of the dispute throughout the legal system. Finally, I will present the opinion as 
given by the majority vote, and end with an overview of the dissenting opinion. An analysis 
of these legal texts will be saved for the 4th chapter. 
 
3.1 The history of Federal Indian Law in the United States 
3.1.1 Historical turning points for Native Americans in U.S. law 
Before delving into the actual Lyng case, it is necessary to briefly discuss some of the 
historical and legal circumstances leading up to this event. The Supreme Court decision needs 
to be viewed in light of a larger discourse of Federal Indian Law, and of the roots and 
traditions embedded in the American legality. As outline in the previous chapter, the Supreme 
Court plays a vital part in determining the scope of law as it pertains to the tribes. Native 
Americans have historically a very complex relationship with the governing powers of the 
United States. As the colonial legacy of the nation-state continues to influence its society, the 
colonial foundation of the American legal system continues to mark its subjects.  
 
Much of the Federal Indian Law body has been created through common law, since Native 
Americans hold this extraordinary position in U.S. law. Therefore, the ability of the Indian 
tribes to fight for their rights over the past centuries has been dependant upon judicial 
decisions, legislative acts, and executive actions. It comes as no surprise then, that majority 
views of the native population have influenced the scope and content of the latter group’s 
rights. As mentioned in chapter 2, there is little written about the tribes in the U.S. 
Constitution. In fact, they are only referred to three places, and two by name. However, by 
singling them out as an authority beside a state or foreign nation, the Founding Fathers laid a 
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course for the branches of government to follow up on, but without much to guide them in the 
text itself.66  
 
The United States became independent in 1776, but there was still much of the territory to 
“conquer.” As such, colonial ideas of discovery and settling new lands were carried through 
to the nineteenth century. These soon became visible in the judicial and legislative texts of the 
day. The Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790 were enacted in order to separate the Indian 
from the settler. Although respecting of the right of the tribes to negotiate treaties, the purpose 
of the acts was to stop private sales so that the U.S. government could control the landmass.67 
On of the other, and if not the most, legendary texts in Federal Indian Law, and U.S. Law 
itself, where actually a trio, handed down by the Supreme Court in the 1820’s and 30’s.  
 
The Marshall Trilogy became infamous for establishing most of the guiding principles of 
Federal Indian Law. None of the tree cases deal with matters of a religious nature. Yet, their 
relevance span the entire field and are most telling in both the defense of Native American 
rights in general and the discriminatory, colonial influences of the court. In Johnson v. 
McIntosh the Supreme Court asked whether a title to land was rightfully obtained from the 
Illinois and Piankeshaw tribes.68 The answer could have been an easy no, since the purchase 
happened after the government forbid private speculation of Indian lands. However, Chief 
Justice Marshall went far beyond the original question and into an elaborate discussion on the 
rights of Indian tribes to own and sell land. The Indian tribes were “the rightful occupants of 
the soil,” but they had lost their complete sovereignty over it when the British asserted their 
“right of discovery” against other nations. The trade relations with the tribes make it evident 
that the North American continent was neither “discovered” nor “conquered.” Still, the court 
needed to legitimize the U.S. government as landowners. It therefore sought a legal principle 
somewhere in between discovery and conquest, which, although was an “extravagant 
pretension” could not be questioned if both asserted and sustained. This claim was given 
further weight by pointing to the condition of the Indians. Their “savage” nature made them 
impossible to live in peaceful coexistence with, yet unfit to cultivate the soil on their own.69  
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In reality, the Supreme Court could not deny that the tribes had been dealt with as a legal 
entity with rights to transfer land holdings. However, it could make sure that plenary power 
over them was vested with federal authorities – the Congress – and thereby guarantee that the 
government had a final say in tribal matters. Moreover, the court could reduce the legal status 
of Natives and their land in order to legitimize further conquest of land. In Johnson v. 
McIntosh the Supreme Court granted the tribes “aboriginal title” to their land, which 
embodied the right to occupy and make use of but not sell it.70 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 
1831 and Worcester v. Georgia a year later established principles denoting the legal status of 
Native Americans. The tribes were deemed “domestic dependant nations,” which signified 
that although their territories were not equal to the power bestowed on the states or foreign 
nations, they were distinct communities with their own authority. Yet, the tribes were under 
federal power in a relationship Marshall called “[resembling] that of a ward to his 
guardian.”71 
 
In a contemporary context it might seem unreasonable that the Marshall Trilogy should carry 
much weight. Chief Justice Marshall’s view of the tribes as fierce savages who needed to be 
protected and civilized, does not fit well into the liberal, multicultural society the U.S. claims 
to be today. However, the common law traditions of the country denotes that important cases, 
such as the Marshall Trilogy, become precedents when courts carry them on through 
employment and citations.72 The discriminatory view of the Indian tribes, upheld by the 
Marshall court and those who followed, have been for the most part a detriment to indigenous 
rights in the U.S. For instance, in 1955, the ruling of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States 
denied Alaskan tribes redress for the harvesting of timbers on lands held with aboriginal title.  
The rationale relied on the plenary power of Congress to abrogate rights of the Natives not 
explicitly stated. The court cited Johnson v. McIntosh as the source of this rule, and in general 
portrayed the tribes as “savage” and “conquered” by “force.”73 
 
The Rehnquist Court, who ruled on the outcome of Lyng, did not use such derogatory 
language. However, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, in the majority opinion there are 
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some interesting phrases and arguments that carry certain connotations to the “savage” Indian 
of the nineteenth century. Although Lyng deals with religious freedom more than sovereign 
rights or land title, these latter two issues are too important to be completely missing from any 
legal matter concerning Native American rights in general. Moreover, Lyng presents a telling 
example of the role and power of the U.S. Supreme Court in shaping self-determination for 
the Native American tribes.  
 
3.1.2 The relationship between Indian Country and the U.S. judicial system in a 
contemporary context 
The judiciary branch of the federal government has had a shifting role for Federal Indian Law 
since the beginning. Based on the examples provided in this chapter, the Supreme Court 
presents itself as the villain in this narrative. Although some of its decisions have had 
devastating consequences for tribal rights, others have benefited the tribes in their pursuit of 
self-determination. In some areas, the court have been an important adversary in curtailing 
state power over the reservations, or in preventing Congress from stretching its plenary power 
to its fullest, possible limits.74 Protection of religious rights, on the other hand, is an area in 
which Native Americans have received little to no protection or support from the courts, 
neither the Supreme Court nor the lower ones. Since the 1950’s only one out of ten federal 
court cases dealing with issues of religious freedom have been ruled in favor of the Native 
litigants.75 Both the general public and the American government have been skeptical to 
Native spiritual beliefs. Christian missionaries were early employed in the civilizing mission 
of the Indian. In the 1880’s, the federal government banned spiritual ceremonies, dances and 
the practices of medicine men on reservations, because of the tribes’ failure to “engage in 
civilized pursuits or employments.”76 In popular culture, Native Americans have long been 
portrayed as contrasts to mainstream Americans – they are a “foil for modernity.”77 Though 
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they might be noble and beautiful, the strange and exotic worldviews of tribal cultures make it 
easy to label them as exotic.  
 
The typical Indian of 1950’s Western movies or popular novels is an outdated stereotype, yet 
it is an exaggeration to claim that tolerance for Native religions has heightened to the point of 
equal acceptance. The ban on ceremonial practices has long been lifted, and Christian 
boarding schools are no longer operating. Parallel to the growing momentum of the self-
determination era, tribes across the country have revitalized traditions and customs by 
bringing back old ceremonies and educating younger generations. Despite these positive 
developments, many of the tribal religions are fragile after decades of being forced dormant 
or into almost-extinction. As noted above, the tribes have received little to no support from 
the courts. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 was created in order to 
provide protection for tribal religions. The uphill battle of religious revitalization and the 
further erosion of Native-owned lands made it clear that neither the Constitution nor 
individual rights as American citizens, sufficed to safeguard tribal spirituality.  
 
The act would create initiatives to ensure a new policy, and “protect and preserve for 
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the 
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians.”78 Policy 
is the key word, however, as the act created no obligations that could be legally enforced. It 
was merely a statement of intent and a recommendation for a new policy. Many federal 
agencies followed up on the purpose of the act. Moreover, tribes were encouraged to now 
seek protection of sacred places and spiritual practices and thus secure the future vitality of 
their religions. Such was the case in Northern California, where tribes began a revitalization 
of tribal dances and ceremonies in the sacred High Country. In addition, the 1970’s saw a real 
growing political involvement. The Yurok tribe fought, and won, rights to fishing on the 
reservation, feeding the positive outlook on tribal self-determination.79  
 
However, the tribes still faced enormous challenges of recognition. Revitalization of religions 
was hindered by the lack of legal protection and the threat of destruction of sacred lands. The 
passing of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act was thought to combat these problems 
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and help change the discourse on indigenous spirituality but by mid-century there were still 
all too few ways for the tribes to seek government protection against infringements on their 
religious and cultural worlds. Therefore, with the passing of the act, and the growing 
momentum of indigenous rights, it seemed the time had come for challenging the dismal 
statistics of Supreme Court decisions on religious rights.  
 
3.2 A short overview of Native American Religions 
3.2.1 North American spiritualities 
The North American continent is home to a vast spiritual world, which despite its immensity 
and variation, often falls under the common denominator of religion. For Americans of 
European decent and background, it is the beliefs and practices of Christian faiths that mostly 
correspond to their view of religion. Many of their ancestors came to the New World to 
escape religious persecution and establish an equal society free of a state religion. The 
Founding Fathers ensured this through the First Amendment to the Constitution, which 
separated the powers of church and state and made it unlawful to either favor one religion 
over another or discriminate against any.80 However, like any other society with a diverse 
population, a certain hierarchy arose, in which the Christian denominations prevailed on top.  
 
Native American cultures are filled with rich and varied spiritual beliefs, but despite their 
diversity and intricacy, the cosmological worlds of the Native tribes was from the colonial era 
labeled as simply “savage.” The Indians were heathens because the European immigrants 
could not recognize visible signs of Christian beliefs in their encounters. The language was 
foreign, likewise the rituals, ceremonies, and deities. They became “the other” in the minds of 
European and this provided justification for removal and reform. Since the middle of the 
twentieth century a slow recognition of Native spirituality grew in the minds of scholars, 
politicians, and the general public alike. However, a mere acknowledgement that the Indian 
tribes have their own religions is not enough. Although they deserve equal protection and 
promotion, Native American religions are not the same as Judeo-Christian religions (as the 
most dominating world religions in the Western world). Even the term religion is rather inapt 
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at describing the spiritual world of 562 different tribes, as its application is mostly for a 
European-American discourse on spirituality, in which certain dogmas, doctrines, and deities 
hold authority.81  
 
Of course, such a generalization goes both ways, and I do not mean to imply that Christian 
and Judaic faiths are all the same, at all times. There is great diversity within all faiths, but on 
the outside the beliefs and practices of world religions, and in the West especially, Christian 
denominations and Judaism are at the center of a discourse of religion. Moreover, the 
concepts employed in such a space are often used to describe Native experiences solely for 
the purpose of comparing the spiritual lives of indigenous peoples to those of Westerners. By 
doing so, the Native American as “the other” is given further life. Among European and 
American cultures there is a great need for categorizing and compartmentalizing, which 
extends to the spiritual world.82 The seemingly foreign and arbitrary beliefs and practices of 
different Native peoples must therefore be sorted out to find some kind of system or inner 
logic. Moreover, they must be categorized in order to make them translatable and comparable 
to Euro-American religious faiths. This conundrum is even pointed out by the dissenting 
judges in Lyng. Justice Brennan writes, “Any attempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian 
life “is in reality an exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian categories [quoting 
the Theodoratus Report].”” 83 
 
In many ways it is wrong to employ the categories and concepts of a religious discourse when 
speaking of the various indigenous spiritual worlds. Yet, in this instance it is necessary. 
Firstly, in a legal context it is required that the tribal beliefs be presented in such a way that 
makes them recognizable to the court. It enables an inclusion in the discourse by singling out 
knowledge deemed legitimate and comparable. Secondly, it is necessary here to point out the 
differences between Native and non-Native worldviews since the core of this project rests 
upon the inherent problem in relating one to the other, seeing as one of them is deemed the 
norm and the other an outsider. For instance, the traditional spiritual beliefs of many Natives 
are part of a cosmology that does not easily separate between the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ 
spheres of life, in contrast to mainstream American views on Christianity, as represented by 
the First Amendment. One aspect of this holistic view is the connection shared by all living 
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creatures, humans, animals, and plants. It signifies the need for bringing all parts of life 
together, and to ensure their future well being through ceremonies.84  
 
3.2.2 The spiritual world of the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa tribes 
The holism often found in many Native American religions has its parallel in the value placed 
on the community. Although the individual experience of spiritual power is important, a 
person’s identity is more interconnected with the family and community than one finds in 
other parts of the American society. Kin relations form the foundation for individual behavior 
and responsibilities, and the extended family often determines one’s place in a community.85 
For the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa tribes, the High Country (the area of dispute in Lyng) is a 
physical and spiritual place for individual quests as well as communal gatherings. The 
ceremonies and rituals performed there are at least 200 years, and archeologists have found 
traces of human existence in this area dating more than 2 000 years back.86  
 
Today, the High Country falls within the boundaries of the Six Rivers National Park in 
northwest California. It is part of a larger geographical area of mountain ranges, forests, and 
rivers, which tribes have lived on and off from since time immemorial. When California 
became a state in 1850, settlers flooded the area, and the tribes were forced into a newly 
created reservation, today called the Hoopa Valley Reservation.87 This was followed by a 
period of harsh assimilation and allotment policies in the late 1800’s, but the tribes in the area 
were able to trek into the forests to the sacred areas of High Country. These travels have 
continued to today, and despite that Chimney Rock is federal property, the tribes still consider 
it their traditional land.88  
 
The High Country provides the most important source for communicating with the Creator. It 
is home to pre-human spirits who helped the first humans survive and a resting place for 
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ancestral medicine men and women.89 These qualities make the area an important source of 
spiritual power but that is not all. According to traditional beliefs, the Yurok, Karuk, and 
Tolowa were parts of the natural order of life. In order to uphold the balance between all 
living things, the tribes had take care of the earth, perform ceremonies and pray for it. If done 
according to the Creator, this would ensure a prosperous future. From these beliefs stem the 
rituals and ceremonies meant to replenish the earth, such as the White Deerskin Dance.90 
People also travel to High Country to gather “medicine” for ceremonies, for personal treks or 
pilgrimages, to receive religious initiation, and finally as a spiritual act in itself. The journeys 
require days of preparation and cleansing and specific trails will lead the person to the 
medicine or the spiritual qualities required for the purpose of the visit. The most sacred places 
are the ones located highest up. The rock outcroppings of Chimney Rock, Doctor Rock, and 
Peak 8 are the most powerful of them all.91 However, the area in itself is a sacred place, and to 
describe ‘sites’ as merely physical locations undermines the cosmological whole, in which the 
psychological and sensory aspects are equally important.92 The wellbeing of the tribes is 
dependant upon the wellbeing of the entire High Country.  
 
For many Native Americans, spirituality is intrinsically tied to the earth, which encompasses 
all human and animal life as well as the land and sky and everything in between. Although 
tribes such as the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa believe in a Creator, they do not perform rituals 
or have ceremonies for the sake of worship. The celebration and praise of the Christian God is 
difficult to find among Native religious traditions. It is important to be thankful of the 
Creator, however, the ceremonies most importantly bind the community together with the 
spirits in an ongoing relationship always in flux.93 Whereas churches and synagogues are 
considered holy places for Christians and Jews, many Native Americans find their “holiness” 
in nature. For the tribes in northern California, the Chimney Rock area is such a holy place. 
Moreover, it is a physical place, and an area of earth and forests and sky that has specific 
spiritual qualities. This means that the tribes who travel here for their rituals cannot take their 
religious activities and perform them elsewhere.94 The mobility of other religions, where 
worship and ceremonies can be practiced anywhere there is a sacred building or an officiator, 
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stand in stark contrast to most Native American religions, including that of the Yurok, Karuk, 
and Tolowa. 
 
Another point of difference can be found in the manner in which religious knowledge is 
transmitted in a society. For many tribes the land is not only spiritual but also sacred and 
therefore not to be shared with outsiders. Vision quests and secret ceremonies in isolated, 
uninterrupted places have been important parts of traditional religions among many groups, 
such as the Tolowa.95 Today they are threatened by modern infrastructure and developments. 
Moreover, as many of these ancestral lands are not under Indian ownership, the tribes have 
little to no power over their use. It was precisely this challenge that faced the Native 
Americans in northern California, and which brought them to the courts. 
 
3.3 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: through the 
U.S. court system 
3.3.1 The beginning of the dispute 
In 1973 the Forest Service in California began planning a project of commercial timber 
logging. They proposed to build a road through the Chimney Rock area so as to easily extract 
the lumber from the Six Rivers National Forest. Tribes soon protested this action as the road 
would cut right through the sacred High Country.96 Moreover, several studies showed that 
these projects would lead to substantial erosion, which would again impact the wildlife 
habitat in the Klamath River.97 In 1977, the Forest Service issued a draft statement on the 
environmental impact of the road, which was six miles away from being completed. 
Following the result of this, and in combination with the enactment of the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act of 1978, the Forest Service commissioned an independent study to 
investigate their “policies and procedures in order to […] protect and preserve Native 
American religious cultural rights and practices.”98 The Theodoratus Report concluded that 
the road should not be built since the entire area is sacred to the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa 
Indians. Moreover, it was “an integral and indispensable part of Indian religious 
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conceptualization and practice.”99 The report warned against accommodating the indigenous 
groups by only isolating some specific places, as the identification of these was inadequate to 
describe the totality of Native religious beliefs and practices. Overall, the report condemned 
the Forest Service for failing to understand tribal religions on their own terms. It pointed to 
the many aspects of sacred qualities in High Country, and not only those that are easily 
discernible to the (non-Indian) eye.100  
 
Nevertheless, in 1982 the Forest Service decided to move on with its planned construction, 
but with a path that attempted at circumventing the most important sacred places, including 
Chimney Rock. Having exhausted their administrative appeals, the tribes took the dispute to 
court. Representatives for the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa tribes sued the chief of the Forest 
Service and the secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for violation of (among 
others) the First Amendment, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Wilderness Act, the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, and government trust responsibilities. The suit was 
filed with the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in 1982.101 
 
3.3.2 The High Country dispute in the lower courts 
Numerous other plaintiffs joined the tribes in their suit: the state of California, various 
environmental organizations, and the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (a 
non-profit organization consisting of the Northwest California tribes).102 Many tribal 
members testified on the importance of High Country and devastation the construction would 
create. Yurok medicine woman Lowana Brantner told the court how “we have lost 
everything, and now we are standing on the last peak.”103 The District Court relied on this 
evidence showing the sacred nature of the Chimney Rock area. It found that both the timber 
harvesting and the road construction would violate the tribes’ rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment because the proposed government actions would cause 
irreparable damage to the tribal religious activities and therefore the wellbeing of the entire 
people.104 Additionally, the court emphasized the importance of the entire area, not just the 
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specific sites identified. It observed the necessity for the High Country being kept peaceful, 
isolated and pristine, and that these conditions were vital not only for the success of the 
medicine men and women traveling there, but for the entire tribe as well as others connected 
to those.105 
 
The District Court relied on a test created by the precedence of several cases regarding 
violations of free exercise. The first part of the test orders the offended party to show proof 
that a limitation by the government is burdensome to their religious practice. If this is met, the 
second part of the test offers the government a chance to override such a burden, if they can 
show a compelling interest in the matter (which outweighs the rights of citizens).106 The 
District Court built on the Theodoratus Report and found evidence there to support the tribes’ 
claims. The sacred High Country was a “central and indispensable” part of Yurok, Karuk, and 
Tolowa religious life, and its spiritual qualities made it difficult if not impossible to separate 
one sacred site from another. The disruption of the area constituted a severe burden to the 
tribes’ constitutional rights. The District Court then denied the Forest Service any compelling 
interest in the case, as it could not find any solid justifications for the planned developments. 
Evidence suggested that the road would not increase net jobs, improve access to timber, 
broaden public access, nor enhance administration.107 
 
As a result of its findings, the District Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
Forest Service from harvesting timber and constructing the remaining section of the road. The 
government appealed the decision on behalf of the Forest Service.108 However, while the 
ruling of the Appeals Court was pending, Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 
1984. Under this statute, most of the disputed area was designated a wilderness, which meant 
that, as a possible environmental disruptive activity, logging would no longer be permissible. 
Thus, half of the suit was no longer up for judicial debate. However, Congress exempted a 
narrow strip from this ban, implying that the remaining section of the road could be built, but 
only if the authorities decided to do so.109  
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed much of the District Court’s 
holdings. It relied on the findings of the lower court in ruling that the Native tribes had 
displayed the central and indispensable nature of the High Country to their religion. Likewise, 
the appellate court found that the federal government had failed to show a compelling interest 
in the road construction. However, the court did note that the manner in which the religion of 
the tribes would be burdened was more indirect than in previous instances. Still, it maintained 
that the burden was significant enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause of the 
Constitution.110 
 
3.3.3 The ruling of the Supreme Court 
The federal government was not at all satisfied with the Appeals Court’s decision. Although it 
believed the Forest Service would be able to comply with the various governmental statutes, 
such as the Environmental Policy Act, it wished to reverse the constitutional findings.111 The 
government put in a formal appeal by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. If granted, it means 
the Supreme Court will review the decision of the lower court and whether the merits (rights 
and wrongs) rests on existing law.112 Such an appeal was granted, and oral arguments in Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association began in November 1987, with the final 
decision handed down five months later. The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the two 
lower courts, with a five-to-three majority vote (and one abstaining). It sided with the federal 
government in not finding any form of burden on the constitutional religious rights of the 
Yurok, Karok, or Tolowa.113  
 
The question in front of the court was as follows: does the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment prohibit the Government from harvesting timber or constructing a road through 
the Chimney Rock area? The court concluded that it did not.114 Writing the opinion for the 
majority, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor divided the rationale of the ruling into 
three sections. Firstly, the court found that the burden placed on the Yurok, Karuk, and 
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Tolowa Nations by the planned Forest Service projects did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.115 This was further substantiated with a reliance on an earlier 
Supreme Court case on a possible religious burden by the government, Bowen v. Roy.116 
O’Connor compared the challenge here to the preceding one and found that they were both 
unfounded as the government in neither would force those involved into violating their 
religious rights. Nor would the action in question deny neither party equal benefits. Moreover, 
the Court found in Lyng that despite the possibility that some actions might affect the practice 
of religious beliefs, the “incidental effects of government programs” do not give the plaintiffs 
any rightful claims under the Free Exercise Clause, nor do they require the government to 
“bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”117 According to the 
court there are a number of governmental programs or actions which will offend the spiritual 
beliefs of one citizen or another. The authorities cannot alter or restrain their activities in 
order to comply with every “citizen’s religious needs and desires.”118 
 
In the second part of the ruling, Justice O’Connor denied the validity of the plaintiff’s claim 
that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 gave authorization to an injunction 
against the road. She rebutted the law as having any enforceable rights that would hold up in 
court, but noted that the Forest Service had complied with the general policy of the act by 
operating as “solicitous” as possible. Additionally, O’Connor emphasized that the Forest 
Service had commissioned an impact study. Although they did not comply with the 
recommendations of the report, the least invasive path was chosen when planning the road 
construction (the one farthest removed from the sites).119 
 
The last part of the ruling was focused on refuting the claims of the judges who voted against 
the ruling. O’Connor found the dissent to rely on an analysis “incompatible with the text of 
the Constitution [and] with the precedents of [the] Court.”120 Further, she claimed they 
misread the legal precedents they based their analysis on. There is a difference between 
outright coercion of a law and the potential impact a law might have which leads to coercion, 
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but merely as an indirect outcome.121 Lastly, the majority overruled a proposal by the dissent 
of a legal test by which the central values of a religion must be examined. 
 
3.3.4 The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, focused on the practical implications of 
the actions. He, along with his fellow dissenting judges (Justices Marshall and Blackmun), 
found it astounding that the majority did not see any infringement of constitutional rights, 
despite the claim by the Native American tribes that the construction would virtually destroy 
their religious practice. The majority only relied on the ‘coercion’ and ‘penalty’ wording of 
the constitutional clause, and not on the impact the clause is meant to cover, according to 
judicial review.122 
 
The dissent used precedents that addressed constitutional rights to free exercise, wherein laws 
denied citizens from enjoying their religious practices, or coerced them into abandoning them. 
Justice Brennan stated that “coercive compulsion [did not] exhaust […] the range of religious 
burdens recognized under the Free Exercise Clause,” and relied on those previous cases to 
show that impact, not merely coercion, gives way to these rights.123 Moreover, he emphasized 
that these precedents observed the impact of a certain law or action, but the majority court in 
Lyng failed to comply with the effect rather than form (of a government’s action). Another 
such distinction was one between decisions that “compel affirmative conduct inconsistent 
with religious belief, and those […] that prevent conduct consistent with religious belief.”124 
 
A further problematic point for the dissent was the comparison between Lyng and the other 
Supreme Court decision, Roy. According to Justice Brennan, these cases should be 
differentiated because the complaint in Roy was against the internal procedures of the 
government, whereas the Forest Service actions in Lyng would likely cause “substantial 
external effects.”125 Moreover, in Lyng the plaintiffs’ freedom of exercising their religion 
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would be impaired if the road was constructed, as opposed to Roy. The American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act is significant here because it, although not creating any judicially 
enforceable rights, emphasizes the desire of Congress to protect Native American religions 
from impairment.126  
 
Finally the dissent then proposed a test for accurately ruling on claims of free exercise 
breaches; the first being on the part of religious adherents and the second the government. 
Claimants would have to demonstrate that the interest in question is central to their religion 
and that a decision by the government would pose “a substantial and realistic threat of 
frustrating their religious practices.” If such can be shown, the government would on its hand 




In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan noted the problematic nature of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, in that by strictly relying on the wording of the Free Exercise Clause, they 
in reality threatened to destroy a religious practice. The lower courts had agreed with him but 
for the majority of the Supreme Court the main argument in Lyng was that the government 
was well in its right to do as it saw fit on its property, as long as it did not actively force the 
tribes to stop practicing their religion (for example by denying access to the Chimney Rock 
area. Such a reading of the law is quite narrow, and the first part of this chapter should 
provide enough context to frame Lyng in a larger picture. The United States court system is 
seeped in a history of colonial relations, and has since the birth of the nation had immense 
power over the legal status of tribes. One legal case can reverberate for centuries to come, by 
creating precedents which extend beyond a legal context into the social imagination. Native 
American tribes have had to fight two fights; one against the legal erosion of their rights and 
another against the public’s image of them and their worldviews. There are inherent 
differences between Native and world religions, such as the value placed on the land as a 
spiritual entity against the separation of deity into its own metaphysical sphere. In 
contemporary United States there should be room for a multitude of religious views, yet as 
the next chapter will discuss, the courts leave a very small space open for tribal religions. 
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Chapter 4 – The judicial treatment of Native American 
spirituality in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association.  
 
The preceding chapter should provide the reader with the historical and legal context 
necessary to examine the case further. The time has now come to turn to an analysis of the 
opinion of the court, as written by Justice O’Connor on behalf of the majority. Such a 
thorough analysis of the ruling is imperative in order to emphasize the importance of Lyng. 
This chapter will therefore shed light on the Supreme Court as a legal arena, in which 
constructions of indigeneity, language, difference and sacredness play vital parts. Such an 
analysis will open up for the placement of Lyng in a larger Federal Indian Law context, as 
well in within the framework of a postcolonial understanding of contemporary legal culture. 
 
4.1 The meeting of the indigenous and the law 
4.1.1. Native Americans in a postcolonial United States 
Native Americans are all citizens of the United States. As such, they take part in the same 
society and are expected to abide by its laws. When appearing in a courtroom, actors enter 
with certain expectations and rules in mind. The legal language and procedures are firmly 
established in the American system, built up over two hundred years of practice. Although the 
United States is no longer a colonial power, the foundations of its law came into being during 
a period of time dominated by colonial ideas and beliefs. As such, it is difficult to speak of a 
U.S. society of postcoloniality, as if the multicultural norm of today is eroding away any 
influences of the past.128 Moreover, some groups in the country will find themselves 
benefiting from the country’s heritage while others will see that their past legal selves still 
influence the system today. In a settler state such as the United States it is possible to discuss 
postcoloniality from own experiences when discussing the former U.S. colonies overseas. 
However, there lies a greater challenge in calling the nation postcolonial domestically, since 
Native Americans continue to live under the rule of their conquerors. For them there has been 
no break from colonial dominance towards self-determination. Native Americans have not 
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been able to form their own government. Although federally recognized tribes have 
jurisdiction on their own territories, these are not fully independent from U.S. authority, and 
are as such not comparable to that of sovereign nations.129  
 
This complex contemporary situation provides us with some difficult questions on indigeneity 
and law in a postcolonial world. The term postcolonial does not denote an easy division 
between before and after colonial powers were present in a country. For Native Americans, 
who have been subject to a form of internal colonialism, the concept is even murkier. 
Navigating a new form of legality, hopefully independent of a European supremacy, has been 
challenging enough for former colonies without any foreign power elite ruling the nation.130 
The internal nature of colonialism in a settler nation enables non-indigenous authority by 
upholding the source of it as integral to the survival of the nation-state. It stands in contrast to 
the decolonization efforts of, for instance, India, where the legal system has been subject to 
changes, away from British customs.131 The indigenous status of Native Americans in a settler 
nation provides a different reality. Any amendments to the judiciary system must be fought 
for within the framework of an Anglo-American legal culture that has never gone through a 
“post” phase. Laws have been added, definitions widened, and procedures expanded, but 
Native Americans (and other indigenous peoples) are continuously forced into the legal space 
of the colonial oppressor. Lyng, although a crucial indigenous issue, was fought over in a non-
indigenous courtroom.  
 
It would be necessary to point out that being indigenous is not the sole relevant factor in court 
proceedings. Although the content matter in Lyng addresses experiences of three Native 
American tribes, claims of constitutional breaches are of importance to all U.S. citizens. The 
Rehnquist Court relied on principles and previous cases that reached beyond the scope of 
Native American religious practices to education and federal services.132 It issued a ruling that 
set a precedent not only pertaining to Indian Law. Scholar and activist Vine Deloria, Jr. has 
claimed that the consequences of Lyng are such as to render any American subject to its 
interpretation of the law. One governmental service or another can put limits on citizens who 
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practices a faith, if the religious adherents cannot show that the government is explicitly 
trying to prohibit their activities.133  
 
Nevertheless, to claim that Lyng is not of particular indigenous importance would be a 
disservice to the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa tribes. For these peoples the issue is not only a 
principle of constitutional rights but also a fight for the survival of their spiritual world. As 
such, the Supreme Court case and proceedings become highly relevant for anyone interested 
in indigenous law. Moreover, it is most constructive to examine the case of Lyng through a 
lens that focuses on the role of the indigenous actor in the courtroom, and the role of the 
courtroom within a postcolonial frame.134 The larger part of the legal document issued by the 
Supreme Court in this instance is centered on dissecting and analyzing the religious views of 
three Native American tribes in California. Both the majority and dissenting opinions entail 
evaluations of how the spiritual world is made up and what is of importance in these tribal 
religions. Moreover, the Supreme Court justices attempt to articulate an understanding and 
differentiation between Native and Western religions in order to provide logic to their 
respective judicial opinions. These interpretations place the Native actors in a space wherein 
the validity of their knowledge of their own religion is dependant upon the analysis of it by 
nine judges who have all been educated, both academically and socially, in a society resting 
on colonial foundations.135 To move beyond colonial structures to a “post” era then becomes a 
difficult task of presentation and representation, mediated in an Anglo-American court of law.  
 
4.1.2 The Supreme Court’s handling of religious rights under the Constitution 
The lawyers for the tribes presented their arguments in court with the purpose of relaying the 
spiritual importance of the Chimney Rock area. That became a more difficult task as the case 
was brought upwards in the judiciary, from the Federal District Court, via the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals before it ended up in front of the Supreme Court. For each step in the 
hierarchy the narrative of the case changed in its scope. The first court spent much time 
listening to the testimonials of religious practitioners and other witnesses, enabling the telling 
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of a story of the spiritual world, as it existed for the tribes. When the case was brought further 
up in the system, this specific narrative became less important in favor of a hypothetical 
discussion on religious rights in general.136 This was evidenced by the oral argument hearings, 
where the tribes’ lawyer had to spend most of her time answering questions by the Supreme 
Court justices on any possible activity which might occur in the future and thus disrupt the 
sacred area.137 Moreover, the court shifted its focus from the claims of the tribes to 
infringement, to a defense of the government.  
 
It is also worth noting the procedures involved when ruling on a case based on a writ of 
certiorari. As Brown points out, “it is a well-settled rule of federal procedure that the Court 
would not disturb findings of facts agreed upon by both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals unless those findings were clearly erroneous.”138 The case had been brought on the 
account of the merits, as in whether the ruling was right or wrong. Consequently, the factual 
findings by the lower courts should have prevailed, and the argument that the government 
could not show a compelling interest for the road construction should have stood its ground. 
As it were, they were not taken into consideration at all. O’Connor wrote that the government 
was vested with the power to use their own land as they see fit.139 Moreover, she employed 
language that hinted at her disbelief in the grave nature of the burden placed before the court. 
“Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit’s prediction […].” Such a 
statement reveals a doubt of the validity of the evidence, which as stated above, and by the 
dissent as well, goes against the rules of court procedure.140 
 
The main argument of the Supreme Court majority was that there exists no constitutional 
protection for religious activities in which the adherents are neither penalized for their 
exercise nor prohibited or coerced from it.141 According to the court, the Constitution only 
protects a person’s religious activity on two accounts. The first being if he or she is 
affirmatively coerced into acting contrary to his or her religious beliefs. In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, the Supreme Court struck down a compulsory law on that account. There, Amish 
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parents were forced to send their children to a school contrary to their religious beliefs of not 
exposing children beyond a certain age to values not consistent with the Amish.142 The second 
form of constitutional protection is accorded to individuals who are penalized if they choose 
to follow their faith. As precedent for this principle, the court pointed to their decision in 
Sherbert v. Verner, where a person was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to 
work on the Sabbath.143  
 
In Lyng, on the other hand, the proposed road construction would not actively prohibit the 
tribal members from traveling into their sacred High Country and perform their rites there, 
nor would they be denied any benefits if they were to continue their practices. Therefore, the 
First Amendment did not apply as it had done in the previous cases mentioned above, and 
others in the opinion by the court.144 Upon reflection, by following these principles the court 
seemed to be perfectly aligned with its own precedents. However, numerous commentaries 
suggest that the opinion is a disruption in the legal development of religious rights cases and 
moreover shows a total lack of understanding indigenous spiritualities and beliefs.145 
 
4.1.3 Providing context to a legal decision: the anomalous yet significant status of 
Lyng in the American legal narrative  
From a law perspective, Lyng came about as a result of two lines of previous cases merging 
their contents together. Claims of infringement upon religious freedom had been brought up 
to the Supreme Court before (as in the instances above). However, Native Americans had per 
1987 never won a Supreme Court case in which a religious practice or sacred site was in 
danger of destruction.146 The various lower courts hearing these cases found that none could 
establish a sufficient burden on their religious activities, nor that the activity in question was 
central to the continuance of the religion itself. However, with the district court predecessor to 
Lyng the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa (and their joining litigants) were able to demonstrate to a 
federal court that the road construction in the Chimney Rock area would place a too heavy 
burden on their religion. The District Court of California put the compelling interest standard 
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to the test but could not either see that the government had interests in the matter which 
outweighed those of the tribes.147  
 
It appeared that there finally was a standard in place for measuring protection of religious 
rights in court. Five years after this entered the legal system, however, the Supreme Court 
went against their previous rulings in a move lambasted by critics from several disciplines. 
Religious scholar Brian Edward Brown stated in his book on Native religions in the legal 
field: “the Supreme Court’s departure form the standard it should have applied to the case is 
egregious.” Moreover, he claimed that the court behaved irresponsibly and decided the case 
on a “shameful absurdity.”148 Legal scholar Kent Greenawalt noted that the compelling 
interest test had been the norm up until the late 1980’s but that the Supreme Court then went 
on to abandon its own standards by extensively narrowing the reading of the Free Exercise 
Clause.149 Native activist and scholar Vine Deloria Jr. claimed the decision had created “a 
major crisis in Indian Country.”150  
 
One the one hand, there is nothing new or shocking about a decision from the judiciary that 
creates controversy. Such is the nature of the common law system in the United States, as an 
always-developing force. On the other hand, the history of Federal Indian Law uncovers the 
inherent power in a legal precedent. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Marshall 
Trilogy of cases in the early nineteenth century is still employed by U.S. courts today.151 
Although Chief Justice Marshall sought avoid language and logic that could be used for 
extreme measures, his decisions have been used as impetus for denying Native Americans 
legal rights over their lands.152 These founding cases highlight the power of the written 
language in a legal narrative. Marshall’s phrase “ward to a guardian” on describing the 
relationship between the tribes and the government has become one of the pillars of Indian 
law.  
 
Lyng is of relatively young age. Nevertheless, the logic employed by the Supreme Court in 
this instance holds immense potential. From the court’s perspective, the issue of the sacred 
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High Country is not about religious survival or indigenous struggles but about the First 
Amendment of the Constitution and the rights of the government. These might be two sides of 
the same coin but the context is quite different from one to another. As a judicial decision, 
Lyng carries its own logic. From a purely legal standpoint it offers a distinct reading of the 
law. However, if one provides context on the role of a legal decision in law in general, and 
Federal Indian Law in particular, it opens up the narrative to reveal a court with a distinct 
position. Thus it becomes important to ask why the case is constructed the way it is and bring 
in the discussion raised above on the relevance of indigeneity in a courtroom. By doing so, 
some neutral truths become exposed for the culturally situated opinions that they are, seeped 
in colonial knowledge production and authoritative placement.  
 
4.2 Indigeneity and the court 
4.2.1 Representations of difference in a legal space 
One of the main points of contention in Lyng is the simple fact that the tribes sought to find 
legal protection for a religion that is not only different from other cases reviewed by the court, 
or the religious beliefs of the judiciaries themselves, but also new to the Supreme Court itself. 
These complex preconditions required the tribes, and their lawyers, to fashion an 
understanding to the court of what religion “is” to the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa. They spent 
much time emphasizing the spiritual qualities of High Country both as a sacred place itself 
and as a physical location for sacred happenings. As described in the previous chapter, this 
area in the mountains always has been, and continues to be, attended by medicine women, 
tribal elders, individuals seeking prayer, and communities as a whole when they gather there 
for ceremonies.153 In testimonies when the Lyng was still at the district level,154 tribal 
members told stories from and of that land to the court. Although they spoke of the religious 
nature of their travels there, they emphasized how crucial the place was to the survival of the 
community as a whole.155 
 
Even though story upon story, or rather page upon page, could be told or written in an attempt 
at making outsiders understand some of these tribal beliefs, it is an almost impossible task to 
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create a full picture of complexity and nuances for legal purposes. Contemporary Native 
experiences in U.S. law hold a great paradox. In order to regain some of the rights they lost 
during the colonial era, the tribes have to fight for these in a space where they are forced to 
convert worldviews to fit into an Anglo-American body of knowledge in order to be 
understood by their colonial masters. Although the “subjugated knowledges” of the Yurok, 
Karuk, and Tolowa were given a space in the legal discourse, they had to be told on terms 
dictated by the court. Not only did they have to follow judicial procedures, but also 
successfully express their spiritual beliefs in a manner that can correspond to a dominant, 
Judeo-Christian understanding of religion.   
 
In his essay on litigation in cases of religious freedom for Native Americans, Robert 
Michaelsen points out the difficulties of presenting one’s case in court as well as trying to 
relate the issue at hand in a manner Western-educated jurors will respond and relate to.156 He 
refers to a tribal member who testified in front of the District Court on the qualities of the 
Chimney Rock area (in the lower court proceedings of Lyng). The witness compared its 
religious importance to that of a church, as a sacred place containing spiritual powers. 
However, Michaelsen notes how even that analogy fails to account for much of the meaning 
and value of High Country. Although some churches are built on places of spiritual 
importance, most can be erected anywhere and become sacred because of what they are 
supposed to contain, whereas most Native sacred sites are holy grounds on their own.157 The 
Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa cannot move the rock formations, plants, or birds there to a more 
convenient or secluded place. 
 
Such analogies relating one religion to another may be applicable in certain legal cases. 
However, with sacred lands litigation the divide between cultural understandings of 
spirituality and religion is greater than a simple metaphor will solve. It is not enough to 
communicate the worldview of a tribe in terms relatable to that of mainstream America, at 
least not from a postcolonial perspective. It negates the possibility of achieving one of the 
project’s two cornerstones. While bringing to the table the stories of the colonized, and giving 
them legitimacy, the masters of the legal space does not allow for their own inherent 
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understandings of the world to be deconstructed. It would be presumptuous and fruitless in a 
U.S. court of law to put forth an argument that the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution is 
inherently colonial and biased against tribes. Yet, for Native Americans, a main goal of 
decolonization is to achieve self-determination.158 In order to reach this state, the tribes need 
to regain control over ancestral lands and given the Anglo-American definition of land as 
property, this needs to be obtained in court. Even a contemporary survey of legal precedents 
reveals, however, the lack of progressive, decolonized narratives available to aid the tribes.159 
Securing the right to practice ones religion on ancestral land would appear a logical step 
towards achieving more self-determination, but as discussed throughout this paper, it has 
proven almost impossible.  
 
U.S. courts are increasingly coming to understand and respect Native cultures and expand the 
conventions of the court by bringing in oral stories as a form of evidence, for instance.160 
However, a tribe’s understanding of the law seem only to go as far as to an interpretation of 
their own religion, yet not the one established through both common and statutory law. In 
other words, U.S. law is the product of a colonial heritage and as such, its interpretation of 
religious rights is influenced by this history. Moreover, it is firmly entrenched in a body of 
knowledge that has been produced and transmitted for the purpose of upholding the religious 
hierarchy in the United States, which validates certain faiths and denominations above 
others.161 Such a differentiation is part of a long-standing tradition in the country: “the Court’s 
unquestioned reliance on a strategy of difference can be most readily understood in the 
context of a thousand year legacy of European-derived racist-imperial discourse.”162 This 
postcolonial reading of American religious constructs reveal the unequal position between the 
indigenous litigant and the Westernized body of knowledge, as purported by U.S. law. 
Nevertheless, it is expected of an indigenous actor to appear in this space ready to relate his or 
her worldview without being able to equally deconstruct the worldview of the court – by 
extension the interpreters of the law.  
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4.2.2 Sacred places and secret sites 
The courtroom operates as a space where evidence is of utmost importance. As such, it is the 
task of the actors to bring as much valuable information to the table in order that a jury or a 
court can interpret those to their advantage. However, it is highly subjective which facts are 
brought into this space, and as has already been discussed, how they are presented. For 
indigenous actors, a courtroom often becomes another challenge between the integrity of their 
culture and customary claims to legitimacy and full disclosure. Most of the dogmas and 
doctrines of Christianity, Islam or Judaism, are bodies of knowledge produced for and 
communicated to a large audience. They pride themselves on their availabilities and 
consequently abilities to convert non-believers.  
 
For many Native American groups, the religious world is a sacred one, which often also 
implies a secret one. It can mean that places, ceremonies, artifacts, or stories, must be kept 
from outsiders and in many cases also members of their own societies (for instance, where the 
sacred knowledge is held only by a few spiritual practitioners). Moreover, many fear that by 
revealing information about their religion, a tribe will loose control over this knowledge, and 
subject it to the interpretation and possible contortion of non-Natives.163 When members of 
the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa began contemplating bringing the dispute with the Forest 
Service to court, they were faced with this dilemma. Many of the elders in the tribal 
communities did not wish to defend the sites in court, as it would mean revealing much of the 
spiritual attributes of that sacred place. The practitioners had for centuries treated the place 
with the utmost respect and privacy. The High Country had such value that much of it was 
only to be spoken of in matters of spirituality.164 Although Native claimants have brought 
sacred knowledge into the legal arena many times before, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa 
tribal members knew that they would have to present their unique worldview in terms 
relatable to the lawyers and judges educated in a Western legal discourse.   
 
The testimonial of tribal members as well as the Theodoratus Report pointed to the 
interconnectedness of Native spirituality and daily life.165 The rituals of the Yurok, Karok, 
and Tolowa were performed, although only by a few, to secure the wellbeing of not only the 
tribe for their own sake but as stewards of the earth. Nevertheless, some of the language used 
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by the court hint at a conceptual framework in which Native traditions were merely equated 
with Judeo-Christian ones, as if they could be easily converted. For example, Justice 
O’Connor claims that one cannot decide on whether the free exercise right has been violated 
based on “measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual 
development.” Further down she writes that some of the government’s actions will possibly 
be “incompatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment.”166 These two quotes seem to 
suggest that the tribes (or tribal members) are suing the government due to some personal 
preference which does not extend beyond their own, individual development. Although it is a 
true statement that medicine women and leaders venture into the High Country on their own, 
the knowledge, wisdom, and medicine they bring back benefits the community. Their calling 
is not for personal proficiency and welfare but for that of the entire tribe (and in extension 
Mother Earth).167 
 
Witnesses and lawyers made an active choice to talk about the sacred qualities of the 
Chimney Rock area, and along with the Theodoratus Report gave the court a chance to gather 
as much knowledge of their worldview as possible. Although making an impact on the lower 
court, these stories were not enough to convince the Supreme Court. Justice O’Connor wrote 
a majority opinion that reduced the complex sacredness of the High Country down to a matter 
of individual fulfillment or choice, in order to make it comparable to Bowen v. Roy, the other 
(and for the most part, only) Supreme Court case, where claims of infringement on religious 
rights were denied. This reduction is a failure on court’s part to realize the constraints of their 
cultural knowledge, wherein the sacred has little emphasis beyond the confines of religious 
buildings or artifacts.  
“Efforts to construct a notion of sacredness in court as a means of creating legal space appears 
to be akin to a cultural defense in criminal litigation in that the court must accept premises 
which are neither shared by the judges’ own cultures or the legal sub-culture and thereby stand 
outside of their values and experiences.”168 
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Of course on can argue that there are physical places in the non-Native world, which are 
considered holy, such as the River Jordan in Egypt or the city of Mecca. According to Vine 
Deloria, Jr., they share some sacred qualities with Native places, if we are to make them 
comparable in any way.169 However, their sacredness is far removed from what makes the 
Chimney Rock area sacred to the Northern California tribes. For them, and for other Natives, 
land is sacred in itself as a living, breathing creature. The High Country is kept sacred by the 
joint efforts of the community in an ongoing relationship with nature itself. Although there is 
sacredness in specific geographical locations, “daily life, ritual practice, […] and ideas of 
origin and World Renewal [incorporate into] a conceptualization of sacredness.”170 
 
Such a body of knowledge is difficult to make legitimate in a legal space. As the judges must 
step out of their cultural worldview, they have to understand how something can be sacred but 
not tangible. Although some places in the Chimney Rock area could be pointed out, many had 
to be experienced, as only could be done by being a part of the culture. Tribes such as those in 
Lyng (but also all over North America) are forced to place a hierarchy on the sacredness of a 
place, with geographical markers at the top. Connecting sacred qualities to sounds or 
aesthetics must be subordinated in favor of markers that are recognizable to a Western 
worldview.171 The Forest Service relied on this construct by planning to build a road removed 
from the “most” sacred places. The Supreme Court accepted this claim as a valid 
accommodation of the tribes, and lauded the agency for circumventing those areas where 
specific rites were preformed, thus negating the full picture of what constitutes a sacred place 
to Native Americans.172  
 
4.3 The arguments of the Supreme Court majority 
 
After the Supreme Court case was decided, a Yurok tribal leader said that the justices “must 
not have understood, because if they did how could they have allowed an ancient religion to 
be completely destroyed just to permit the construction of a road?”173 Justice Brennan, who 
dissented, other tribal activists, legal scholars and academics from other disciplines, all shared 
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this view. To them, it appeared that the court had failed to interpret the law within a 
framework where Native religious beliefs are equal and valid to those of themselves and the 
majority population. It is difficult to see how the amounting evidence from both indigenous 
and non-indigenous alike portraying Chimney Rock and the surrounding area as most central 
to religious activity and vitality failed to convince the court. According to the majority of the 
justices, however, differing worldviews and forms of knowledge had little to do with the 
outcome. They saw the tribes’ claim as a possible abuse of the Constitution and of what it 
protects U.S. citizens from.  
 
In the written opinion, the Supreme Court called the effects of the road construction on tribal 
religions “incidental,” and further stated that it was not the intention of the Forest Service to 
penalize the tribes because the government was only using its own property as it sees fit. But 
what the majority call a side effect, others have called biased and discriminatory.174 In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder it was established that a public law on school attendance interfered with 
Amish religion and therefore their way of life. In that decision it appears the court was able to 
comprehend that for the Amish, religion is not separated from other spheres of life, such as 
education.175 A similar understanding of Native religions was not presented in Lyng.  
 
4.3.1 Internal versus external 
This emphasis on a “private person’s ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their 
own religious beliefs” is given weight by the Supreme Court through their decision in Bowen 
v. Roy. The issue at hand in that suit was whether the governmental policy of Social Security 
numbers interfered with free exercise rights of a girl, whose father claimed the registering of 
her robbed her of her spirit.176 The majority and dissent in Lyng disagreed on whether these 
two cases could be meaningfully differentiated from each other, with the former claiming 
them to be similar on the account of the action interfering with “internal affairs” of the 
government. Moreover, O’Connor wrote that it was not possible for the court to evaluate the 
effects of either against the other. On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that construction 
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of a road through traditional lands of at least three tribes, whose religious activities are 
dependent upon that area, can be labeled an “internal affair” of the government. One only has 
to point to the proceedings prior to the case entering the judicial system. The Forest Service 
went through numerous steps to voice public opinion about the project and how it would 
affect the area. As DeLashment mentions, this shows the very external nature of the 
project.177 
 
According to the Supreme Court, the Forest Service in fact showed great “solicitude” in 
calling for the environmental impact study, and upon choosing not to adhere to its 
recommendation at least picked the route least invasive to the tribes. This effort, along with 
sufficient adherence to the principles laid out by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 
was enough to warrant commendation by the court.178 Of course, the act does not have any 
statutory force, but the court makes almost an outright mockery of its intent. It is difficult to 
see how the tribes’ “inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional 
religions” were accorded with, which brings us back to another point of difference between 
Roy and Lyng.  
 
4.3.2 The individual versus the group 
The claimant in Roy would not loose his ability to practice or express his (and his daughter’s) 
religion, rather damage the spiritual development of the child. Although the court in Lyng 
employed language categorizing the infringement as one on an individual’s personal 
development, the burden this road would place on the women and men of the three tribes 
stretches much further than the personal spiritual development of the practitioners. The 
spirituality of the daughter in Roy was not crucial to the survival of the Abenaki Tribe, of 
which the father was descendent from.179 The distinction here between the religious rights of 
the individual versus the group seems thus to have been overlooked, as the comparison 
between the two cases dismisses the importance of the group as a religious entity among 
indigenous communities.  
 
                                                
177 DeLashment (1989), 92. 
178 Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA 485 U.S. 439, 454 (1988). 
179 Carpenter and Bowers points out that the tribal affinity of the plaintiff in Roy was murky, 
and that among the Abenaki there was little to suggest they were actually against the use of 
Social Security numbers (2011, 518). 
 59 
Much of the language from Roy was used in the court opinion to give weight to their 
argument, but the reliance on individual claims does not cover the extent of religious 
complexity of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa. Although the tribes value the individual 
contributions of medicine men and women, these are made within the context of a 
community.180 As such, the language of the court exposes the Judeo-Christian constructs of 
religion in which the individual’s relationship with a deity is crucial, yet shaped by dogma 
and written words that are easy to cite evidence from. In the case of Roy, the court seemed to 
fear that if they ruled in favor of the plaintiff, there was no limit to the kinds of personal 
religious preferences the government would have to adhere to in future suits. Moreover, in 
their brief for Lyng, the government acted as if the spiritual importance, and long history, of 
the High Country could be equated with the father in Roy’s “sudden” awakening to his 
daughter’s spiritual danger.181  
 
4.3.3 Language of the court as a source of power 
The affirmations of AIFRA to promote Native religions fell short in front of the court’s 
discourse of power and property. Through the eyes of the Rehnquist court, the protection of 
this sacred site was a dangerous move. Firstly, it would open up the legal process for 
countless religious claims in the future from groups seeking to “exclude all human activity 
but their own from sacred areas of the public lands.” Secondly, it would divest the 
government “of its right to use what is, after all, its land.”182 Both these claims place the 
affront on the indigenous litigants, and turns around their effort to protect themselves from 
infringement to an effort to infringe upon the government as well as others who might have 
an interest in the area. By portraying the American Indians as greedy or demanding, in 
“requiring de facto beneficial ownership” it becomes easier for the court to base its reasoning 
on a public interest, as if that really were the case.  
 
However, numerous non-indigenous groups joined the Indian plaintiffs in the suit, as well as 
the state of California, comprising a diverse collection of interests all united for the protection 
of the area from development. Moreover, the collective nature of the suit negates the 
majority’s claim that the road was an affront to the personal development of a few 
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individuals. The public interest claim is more a theoretical aspect than an empiric one, as 
evidenced by the oral arguments. The representative for the Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association had to spend most of her testimony answering hypothetical questions 
from the Supreme Court justices. She defended that the tribes sought protection against the 
road construction specifically, and not against all foreseeable or unforeseeable future 
disruptions. Still, the justices asked numerous questions about a variety of activities, which 
theoretically could impair the religious activities of the tribes. Moreover, they seemed intent 
on equating this form of protection as a “set-aside” as if the issue at hand was whether all 
activities in the area should be banned (probably violating the Establishment Clause).183 
 
4.3.4 Land as property, land as culture 
As mentioned elsewhere, the majority put much emphasis on the ownership claim. Some 
scholars, such as Vine Deloria, Jr., have argued that this reasoning moves Lyng beyond the 
legal discourse of indigenous rights and into a more general American discussion of property. 
To some extent that is true, in that by denying citizens religious protections of public lands, 
the court signaled the authority of the government against the public.184 Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to discuss property and indigenous rights without connecting the two. As pointed out 
previously, the religious beliefs of Native Americans are often tied to place, and place as a 
physical, empiric reality. There are few places in the Judeo-Christian religions that are 
considered sacred or holy. But these can be easily separated from the non-sacred.185 Generally 
speaking, the world religion put more emphasis on the abstract, metaphysical composition of 
their spirituality.  
 
To speak in generalized terms, the religious connection of tribes to place is in contrast with 
the Euro-American separation of church and state, of the religious and secular spheres, and of 
property and culture. The First Amendment of the Constitution should ensure that these 
differences are not the cause of unequal treatment, yet as the historical recounting of Native 
American spirituality showed, this has not been the case. However, for the Lyng majority it 
seemed enough to circumvent this inherent disadvantage by clinging to the property card. As 
such, the court could hide behind the rules of law in order to distance themselves from the 
                                                
183 “Oral Argument Transcript,” Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
184 Deloria, Jr., quoted in Gooding (1996), 168-169. 
185 Deloria, Jr. (2011), 4-5. 
 61 
reality in front of them. Carson notes how proper management of federal lands is crucial to 
the economic welfare of the United States and as such gives the federal government a 
mandate in ensuring this.186 However, to use this as an argument in the particular instance of 
Lyng falls flat, since the Federal District Court had already ruled that the Forest Service had 
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in the area which would surmount to ensuring this 
aspect of the federal responsibility.187  
 
Empirically speaking, the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa have a different relationship with the 
High Country than the government does. The attorney for the tribes also points out in her oral 
argument that the tribes have performed their rituals in the High Country “long before the 
Federal Government even came into existence,” a statement that was promptly ignored by the 
justices.188 The Chimney Rock area is legally speaking government land, and therefore 
subject to its authority. However, historically and culturally, it has been and continues to be 
permeated by indigenous presence and activity. Such is the case with traditional lands all over 
the country. It seems impossible to engage in a discourse on indigenous rights and accept the 
authority of European-derived property rights as the only rightful ones. The U.S. 
government’s land ownership is based on the subjugation of its indigenous peoples, and it is 
therefore not surprising to see the Supreme Court almost ignore this historical relationship in 
favor of defending its property rights.  
 
It does not take much deconstruction to see that such a attitude reveals the colonial heritage of 
the courts’ authority. Moreover, it points to the denial of it by those charged with upholding 
this narrative as (if not the only one) the main one. But to affirm and entrench the colonial 
foundation of the legal system is to deny the history of Native American subjugation. Justice 
O’Connor claims to take into consideration “the sympathy we must all feel for the plight of 
the Indian respondents,” yet with this statement makes the situation appear as something of 
the past, to be pitied, not rectified.189 She is addressing indigenous concerns as if they are past 
the point of contention. Yet in settler nations such as the U.S. it is difficult to label any 
contemporary reality with a “post” mark.190 One can surely trace changes in government 
attitudes towards Native American concerns but as outlined in chapter two, these tend to 
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swing from one end of the political spectra to another. There has been no clean break with 
colonialism and a refusal to admit this then continues to subjugate the worldviews of the 
indigenous population. 
 
The differentiation between different forms of knowledge is further revealed in the Lyng text. 
As many commentators have pointed out, the majority seemed unwilling to understand tribal 
religious activities on their own terms.191 The decision only briefly dwells on the 
distinctiveness and complexity of the tribal religion but devotes a few lines to general outlines 
of the activities going on in the forest.192 In his dissent, Justice Brennan notes that it is 
problematic how little time the majority spends on discussing the nature of the tribal religions. 
Moreover he emphasizes how important it is to understand them in order to create an accurate 
analysis.193 This lack of comprehension, and of willingness to looking into other worldviews 
without having to resort to general and imprecise analogies, becomes the manifestation of the 
court’s continuous subjugation of the knowledges of the Other. Lyng provides us with some 
compelling empirical evidence of the court’s bias against non-Western religions, which 
importance for deconstructing and decolonizing the American legal landscape will be 
discussed more in the next chapter. 
 
4.3.5 The Supreme Court’s failure to protect a tribal religion from destruction 
Per the Lyng majority opinion, the court’s reading of the Constitution and thus applied in this 
instance was well within the boundaries of this legal interpretation. Yet, most opponents of 
the ruling claim the case as a departure from previous principles by choosing an incredibly 
narrow and formalistic reading of the founding document. The majority relied on 
distinguishing Lyng from its predecessors via a separation “between governmental actions 
that compel affirmative conduct inconsistent with religious belief, and those governmental 
actions that prevent conduct consistent with religious belief.”194 According to the text of the 
majority, the road in question would interfere with the tribes’ ability to practice their religion. 
However, the tribes presented evidence to demonstrate that the future vitality of their religious 
world would be destroyed should this road be built and the High Country interfered with. 
These findings were claimed to be sufficient burdens of proof by the District Court and the 
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Circuit Court of Appeals, yet the majority of the Supreme Court found that “the Constitution 
simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents’ legal claims.”195 
 
The court claims to abandon any test of centrality as a means to evaluate whether the spiritual 
practices of the tribes are in sufficient dangers. According to Justice O’Connor it would 
bestow upon the court the task of possibly deciding that the religious practitioners have 
misunderstood their own religion and which aspects of it are most vital.196 More so, the oft 
differences between the worldviews of Native Americans religions and Judeo-Christian 
makes it even harder for the court to evaluate such claims.197 Despite this seemingly noble 
statement it is hard to believe that in its deliberation the court did not make any judgment on 
the importance of the Chimney Rock area to the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa. Abandoning the 
centrality test appears in reality more as an effort to draw attention to the point, which, 
according to their reasoning, is prevailing in this matter – that the tribes were not forced or 
prohibited from exercising their religious faith. Yet, as Justice Brennan writes in his dissent, 




This narrow and heavily biased reading of the Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause, and the 
property values of the legal discourse, however, stood its ground. Lyng as a singular Supreme 
Court case is an interesting piece of law in itself. This chapter has focused on the many 
aspects of the decision in which the majority justices failed to comprehend the complexity 
and uniqueness of tribal knowledge as a narrative on its own. The tribes subjugated 
themselves to a space in which they have historically been at a great disadvantage in the 
hopes of moving the indigenous rights discourse forward. However,  the court’s reliance on 
difference (but unequal), property rights, and imprecise readings of legal precedents, reveals 
both the authority their worldview holds and the colonial advantages the U.S. legal system 
still benefits from. From focusing on the structures within Lyng as one example, we will now 
turn to a discussion of the longer lines in Federal Indian Law. Moreover, the next chapter will 
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Chapter 5 – Religious rights after Lyng; Native American agency 
in a postcolonial United States.  
 
This last chapter of analysis will bring the 1988 Supreme Court decision into the last decades. 
Despite being over 25 years old it is still a topic of discussion among scholars and Native 
American activists. It is interesting to look at how the Lyng decision continues to shape the 
landscape of religious rights for the indigenous peoples of the Untied States. However, there 
have been many developments in other areas, and most of them instigated by the peoples 
themselves. This chapter will therefore focus on the kinds of active participation and agency 
the Lyng decision spurred. At the same time it is vital that the context of this case is brought 
to light so as to examine the contemporary narrative of Federal Indian Law against its colonial 
history. Finally, the role of a postcolonial narrative in law will be highlighted in an effort to 
analyze whether the move away from courtroom landscapes is beneficiary for the Indian 
Nations in the end.  
 
5.1 The aftermath of Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA  
Reflecting on the Supreme Court case, Abby Abinanti, the Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribe, 
said, “Lyng was a complete moral and legal disregard of religious freedom. The decision was 
wrong then and it continues to be wrong.”199 Standing Rock Sioux historian Vine Deloria 
claimed, “today a major crisis exists in Indian country because of the Lyng decision.”200 
These Native activists and scholars were joined by numerous others in crying out their 
outrage of the Supreme Court, but there was more to follow.  
 
5.1.1. The defeat of Congressional protection of Native rights 
The Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa, along with many other tribes and Native activists had hoped 
that Lyng would become a bench mark standard for protection of Native spirituality and 
sacred sites. Instead, the Supreme Court relied on Judeo-Christian notions of religion and 
wrote a majority opinion that firmly entrenched the issue in Western ideas on the relationship 
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between the individual, the government, and the sacred realm. Although indigenous religions 
have been a part of the American legal discourse since the birth of the nation, governmental 
protection of their rights is of very recent origin. Up until the twentieth century, tribal 
religions were seen as a danger to the civilizing mission of the Indian.201 Official citizenship 
was not even extended to all Native Americans until 1924. As mentioned in previous chapter, 
it was not until the Natives’ own rights movement in the 1960’s and 70’s that something 
started to happen on the federal level. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 
signaled the government’s willingness to accept, accommodate and protect tribal religions. 
Many tribes hoped that Lyng could provide the judicial equivalent of an affirmation so 
desperately needed. Instead, it turned the developments upside down and brought the 
legislative branch with it.   
 
The Supreme Court denounced the act as having any legal force. From the outset, this was not 
the intention of the act yet there was still an outcry when the Lyng decision came out. Justice 
Brennan wrote in his dissent that: “[in the act] Congress expressly recognized the adverse 
impact land use decisions and other governmental actions frequently have on the site-specific 
religious practices of Native Americans.” Moreover, the act was created to protect “the 
freedom to believe, express, and exercise a religion.”202 Suzan Shown Harjo, a Muscogee-
Cheyenne writer, was heavily involved with both protests and Native American activism and 
lobbying in the 1970’s.203 She sat in when the House of Representatives voted on AIFRA. 
After hard negotiations, the act became a “policy statement. It would be a context for and 
would set in motion a procedure for subsequent substantive law.”204 In Indian Country there 
was hope that sacred sites and ceremonies would gain notice and protection with this 
Congressional measure. The Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng crushed any wish of that, and 
even led to federal agencies abandoning the policies set out by the act. Harjo remembers how 
people thought there might be something substantial about AIFRA after all, but “the Supreme 
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Court gave the Forest Service exactly what they wanted and exactly what they had set up, and 
that was our defeat in the Lyng case.”205 
 
5.1.2 Another judicial rejection of religious freedom  
More than crushing the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the Supreme Court in Lyng 
set a barrier for constitutional protection of sacred sites that was almost impossible to 
surmount. It dealt a further blow to religious freedom for Native Americans two years later, 
when the court voted against two Native respondents in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (hereafter Smith).206 The two men had been fired from 
their jobs for ingesting peyote during ceremonies in the Native American Church, as part of a 
sacrament. However, the Employment Division of Oregon denied them unemployment, 
because of their “misconduct” at work (a private drug rehabilitation center), which violated 
the criminal code of the state. The Native respondents sought an exemption from this code 
and claimed that the law violated their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. 
The case was brought up through the system and reached the Supreme Court, which sided 
with the state of Oregon.207   
 
The decision stands out for “dramatically [departing] from well-settled First Amendment 
jurisprudence,” according to O’Connor (the Supreme Court justice who handed down the 
Lyng decision).208 The majority disregarded finding any persuasive interest for the state to 
deny the two practitioners unemployment rights and moreover found it unsound to use this 
compelling interest test at all. If a law is valid, there is no need for any exemptions based on 
religious freedom. Thus, Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, abandoned much of the 
free exercise doctrine previously used by the court and rather claimed that minorities seeking 
protection of their religious practices should take make their claims political rather than 
judicial.209 As the majority claimed similarly in Lyng two years before, the unlawfulness of 
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peyote use, and its resulting events in this case, were merely incidental effects not covered by 
the First Amendment.210  
 
Although the majority in Smith claimed to distinguish this matter from others of a religious 
nature that would afford Free Exercise protection, Greenawalt makes an interesting analogy in 
his article on the Rehnquist Court.211 He states that the Smith decisions fails to protect any 
central form of worship, regardless of faith, but that the outcome would be different if the 
faith in question was a majority one. If a law prohibits drinking of alcoholic beverages in 
general, it would also include wine at a Catholic Mass and still be considered lawful. 
However, as Greenawalt points out, this is merely a hypothetical, for as soon as such a law 
would have been enacted, the state legislature would have overridden it in order to protect the 
Catholic faith. A smaller faith, on the other hand, does not have the same support in the 
government, and is therefore more vulnerable to laws that seem neutral but only affects them 
(as in the use of peyote).212 
 
Smith dealt a devastating blow to indigenous communities, to religious freedom, and to belief 
in the justice system. Yet, the political mood of the country was such in the early 1990s as to 
combat these judicial developments. In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. It specifically reversed the Smith decision and reinstated the compelling 
interest test, for all levels of government.213 However, the Supreme Court struck down on the 
act in another (non-Indian) case and denied state and local governments to reinstate the test. 
Then again, Congress passed amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 
1994, which prohibited states from penalizing Native Americans who use peyote for religious 
ceremonies.214 The push-and-pull between judicial and legislative power thus continues.   
 
For the Native communities, these major upsets forced them to seek rights protection outside 
of the court. Those among the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa tribes who had been involved in the 
legal process of Lyng turned their resources towards educating tribal members (their own as 
well as from other nations) about the case and the consequences its ruling had for religious 
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freedom and site protection. Two years after the decision, the High Country and surrounding 
areas became part of the Siskiyou Wilderness Area, which prohibited any form of 
development. The road was left unfinished.215  
 
5.2 Are Native American religions protected by the Constitution? 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Lyng, and the further defeat in Smith, made it almost 
impossible for Native Americans to seek judicial protection of their religious sites. Despite 
positive developments in the executive and legislative branches of government, the judicial 
branch seemed determined to curtail or even diminish the rights of Indian tribes. The 
Rehnquist Court has been devastating to Indian rights, and in particular to those pertaining to 
religion.  
 
5.2.1. Historical disadvantages 
The Lyng decision left the tribes with few clues as to how their religious beliefs were 
protected by law. According to the Rehnquist Court the government had to create outright 
obstacles in order for a religious practitioner to claim a breach of their constitutional rights. 
Such a reading of the First Amendment is quite narrow and according to some, outright 
discriminatory towards Native religions. By distinguishing between direct and indirect 
actions, the Supreme Court drew a line wherein Judeo-Christian faiths are protected and tribal 
ones are not.216  
 
United States law is meant to offer equal protection to all citizens yet as has been highlighted 
by several examples, there is an inherent bias in the courts’ readings of statutory and common 
law (the Constitution and legal precedents). This goes of course beyond Lyng as a singular 
dispute, and if we contextualize the hereditary structures of these beliefs we see how the 1988 
Supreme Court brought with it colonial ideas into the contemporary legal space. The bias 
against tribal religions can be traced back to the Founding Fathers.217 As discussed elsewhere, 
colonial beliefs of the Indian have always permeated society and consequently influenced the 
legal discourse. Native Americans were hardly mentioned in the founding documents. But the 
                                                
215 Carpenter and Bowers (2011), 526-527. 
216 Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams, Jr. (2005), 748. 
217 Williams, Jr. (1989), 248-250. 
 70 
question of religious freedom was important in the creation of rules of law in the new 
American nations, since many of the settlers came to the continent to escape religious 
persecution. The role of religion in the new society, although separated from other spheres of 
life, got a central role in the legal construction of rights and principles.  
 
The Lyng majority diminished the importance of the tribal religions by presenting them as 
merely an accumulation of the beliefs of individual practitioners. Such a bias has a long 
standing in American history, where individualism is a core ideology. The communal strength 
of Native societies has throughout the country’s history been considered a danger to 
civilization. The Allotment Act of 1887 in its core was an attempt to make individual 
landowners and cultivators of the Indian.218 Today we see how that project largely failed and 
instead created checkerboard reservations, where non-Natives held title to pieces of land in-
between. Many tribes are today in the process of buying back all the land lost to non-Natives 
and thus regain ownership of their ancestral lands.219 This development is a testament to the 
agency of Native Americans, acting without little aid from the government. The Rehnquist 
court displayed their bias against the value of community as owners and practitioners of land 
and religion. It seems that the only way tribes will gain legal recognition of their communal 
rights, is if they can aptly be translated into Western ideas of individual ownership over land, 
and reduced to the mere summation of individual rights.220   
 
5.2.2 Conflicting views on the agency of the Rehnquist Court  
According to legal scholar Bryan Rose, the theology of the drafters of the founding 
documents is to blame for the inherent discrimination of Native beliefs.221 The Constitution 
was written in such a language as to make it impossible for the courts to interpret it in line 
with tribal religions. First of all, it emphasized religion as a sphere separate from others, 
especially in public services. Second, the First Amendment should protect the rights of the 
individual. A citizen should have freedom of religious belief and opinion. A belief in the 
communal aspects of spirituality, on the other hand, did not go into the theological discussion, 
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nor did it include a worldview where space was not only a metaphysical concept but also a 
geographical location.222 As such, the Constitutional amendment does not protect tribal 
religions because they are completely different from that of the founding fathers, and 
therefore outside the grasp of the law. According to Rose, this lessens the burden of the 
Rehnquist court, since “the courts continue to apply doctrines that, because they are derived 
from the Religion Clauses’ traditional Western notions of religious freedom, are inadequate to 
protect the religious life of Indians.”223 
 
Such a claim might offer a mediating viewpoint of the Rehnquist Court. It places the agency 
of the judicial body so entrenched in the institutional structures as to leave little room for 
oppositional narratives.224 Their judicial reviews have naturally been influenced by the 
Constitution and as such are reflections of that original intent. On the other hand, the judiciary 
is as influenced by social and political structures as any other. The Marshall Trilogy stands 
out as an example of not only how the law can support a body of knowledge but also 
determine it. The “savage” Indian of the 1800’s was an image conjured up in the public’s 
mind, aided and formed by governmental policies and legal texts. Therefore, U.S. courts are 
heavily loaded weapons that use the written word as their ammunition. Noted Indian Law 
scholar, Robert Williams, Jr., claims the legitimate status the written law enjoys in Western 
societies has given the dominant groups the authority to suppress alternate narratives, 
including those of Native Americans.225 
 
Moreover, the authority of the law has enabled the U.S. government to hold back 
decolonization efforts by determining the narrative on self-determination for the tribes. 
Williams makes a comparison between the rights discourse of contemporary Natives and the 
federal policies of the 1830’s, when all the tribes in the East were forcibly removed 
westwards. Although Chief Justice Marshall had provided some legal texts that validated the 
legal rights of tribes to govern their land, these were ignored in favor of other documents that 
supported Removal policies based on their narrative of the uncivilized Indian. This historical 
                                                
222 Rose (1999), 129-130. 
223 Rose (1999), 132. 
224 Ortner (2006), 131. 
225 Williams, Jr. (1989), 260. 
 72 
legacy of opposition to Native American self-determination, or tribalism, continues to 
permeate law and policy today, according to Williams.226 
 
His interpretation of the law as a tool for creating a narrative, places a heavier burden on the 
Rehnquist Court than Rose would argue. Instead of being directed by the Constitution, and its 
original intent, modern-day courts are using the legal text in order to legitimize their colonial 
heritage and advantage. A postcolonial reading of this space reveals how the dominant society 
continuously benefits from the discriminatory principles inherent in the U.S. Constitution. 
Moreover, by putting this theory to work it opens up the narrative to expose these structures 
for what they are, culturally constructed bodies of knowledge that negates the legitimacy of 
colonized people.  
 
5.2.3 The construction of land as property 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on the property aspect of the Chimney Rock area revealed how 
Lyng was decided on the basis of a culturally situated understanding of land. As is the case in 
many industrialized nations, land holds value as individual property. The American 
constructions of land are seeped in a history of colonialism and oppression. Since the 
Crusades, European thinkers have been gathering texts and ideas to support a worldview in 
which subjugation of non-Christians is a legitimate pursuit.227 Conquering the land and 
converting the heathens went hand in hand during the European takeover of the Americas. 
The Puritan work-ethic and strict sense of moral informed many of the British colonies, and 
the foreign (to them) cultures of the North American tribes stood in stark contrast to this 
paradigm. A battle of culture versus nature entered the Euro-American mindscape, wherein 
“the wild savage” must be defeated as an obstacle to civilization. Moreover, as discussed 
above, the “savage” nature of the indigenous population gave the founding fathers reason for 
excluding them from the legal narrative of the U.S. Constitution.  
 
In the early 1800’s, immigrants came to the new nation en masse and spilled over the original 
boundaries, guided by Manifest Destiny.228 This slogan became an embodiment of the 
American obsession with pursuit of territory and conquest. It relayed the important task 
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supposedly given by God, to settle the land, cultivate it, and thus create a divine civilization. 
It is not a coincidence that this venture happened at the same time as the tribes in the east 
were forcibly removed from their lands. Nor was it by chance that the Frontier was declared 
closed in 1890. To most Americans, this event marked the complete settling of the continent, 
and a narrative of struggle and territorial pursuit came full circle. The West, which permeated 
the mind of many a settler in the late nineteenth century, was finally “won.” This end of the 
full reach of civilization share its anniversary with the last, yet possibly, most terrible 
massacre in Native American history. The Wounded Knee Massacre in December of 1890 
became a cruel symbol of the end of Indian resistance.229  
 
A contemporary narrative of the American land conquest embodies the view of these 
historical events as steps towards modernization. Although Wounded Knee is taught in 
history books, its loneliness symbolized the negation of a Native narrative. Such a story 
reveals that the conquest of America was not a simple matter of military might and the spread 
of civilization but rather that the official government drove a campaign to eliminate the tribes 
from their own land and alongside gained legitimacy for their story through the backing of 
law and official policies. 
 
As such, Lyng becomes a modern reincarnation of old narratives. By reducing the complex 
relationship between the tribes and the land, the Supreme Court was able to single out the two 
parts of the narrative suited to their logic. First, religion is an individual affair separated from 
the socializing constructs of a community. Second, the most important quality of a piece of 
land it’s the rights entitled to its owner (in the Western, legal sense of the word). As long as 
the government is not doing anything to actively punish an individual’s religious affairs, it 
can rely on its title as legal owner of the property to justify any action.230 Some commentators 
of Lyng argue that the court’s reliance on property law was inevitable because it could not 
escape the number of precedents relying on Anglo-American understandings of land.231 That 
may be true but the logic only holds up if you remove all social and cultural contexts from the 
interpretation of law. As much as a history of colonialism has contributed to a legal narrative, 
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a contemporary view should be able to stretch in order to accommodate other worldviews, if 
the integrity of USA as a multicultural nation is to be kept intact.  
 
5.3 Changing the narrative on legal treatment of indigenous religions 
5.3.1 Legislative and executive measures to combat the effects of Lyng 
The Rehnquist Court’s interpretation of land and of religious infringement left Native 
American activists with little hope that the judiciary would abandon their colonial discourse. 
Both the Lyng and Smith decisions narrowed the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to such an extent as to render it almost impossible to win any other cases where 
tribal religions were involved. It has caused many commentators of law to ask about the 
motives of the judiciary in presiding over Federal Indian Law cases. The Supreme Court has 
taken on quite a number of them while displaying less than favorable attitudes towards the 
content matter. Some believe the court has an agenda in securing the rights on non-Natives 
against tribal sovereignty, which can be seen as a treat towards the nation-state.232 
 
Nonetheless, the fight carried on elsewhere. Both individuals and tribal government quickly 
started gathering activists in order to create legislation to curtail the effects of the court 
decisions.233 In 1992, Congress amended the National Historic Preservation Act to include 
“properties of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe” as possible 
inclusions in the National Register of Historic Places. Furthermore, federal agencies would 
have to consult with the tribes if they wished to undertake any actions that might interrupt 
those sacred properties.234 The Forest Service has also adapted its proceedings following these 
legislative amendments, even though it was not explicitly directed to do so by the new 
additions. Regulations have since 2000 been changed to include a special mention of Native 
Americans, which instructs the Forest Service to identify and consider tribal rights in any 
planning process.235  
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Such efforts by the agencies directly involved with tribal matters and tribal sites signal a 
departure from the rights frame laid out by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the executive 
branch of government adopted the same changes towards tribal religions. President Bill 
Clinton signed an executive order in 1996, which required managers of federally owned land 
to accommodate tribal religious activities and avoid disrupting the spiritual integrity.236 Such 
emphasis by the federal government has led to a closer cooperation between tribes and 
agencies. The National Park Service, for instance, agreed to close of Devil’s Tower in 
Wyoming from climbers, as they disturb the spiritual qualities and ceremonies held there by 
several different tribes.237 Quite recently the Yurok Tribe has partnered with the Western 
Rivers Conservancy to protect the Lower Klamath River, and restore the wildlife habitat after 
damages from irrigation and development project. The initiative is an interesting example 
both of Native activism and local cooperation, and the efforts taken by tribes to restore the 
ecological sustainability and thus spiritual vitality of their homelands. 238 
 
5.3.2 The road to self-determination 
Much of what is happening between tribes and federal (or state) agencies rely on a voluntarily 
cooperation. Although the government is taking steps to accommodate the tribes, and thus 
include their worldview in their discourse, most of the federal legislation only requires that 
the tribes be consulted on issues pertaining to them. In other words, Native Americans are 
given the ability to negotiate the scope of the narrative but they are not given the power to 
establish their own terms. And, since they do not have any legal precedents to support their 
claims, they are still dependant upon the authority of the government. It might seem that 
despite the recent changes, “the boundaries of sovereignty for Native peoples remain defines 
and controlled by the power of the U.S. state.”239 
 
For many tribes across the country, protection of religious sites continues to confirm old 
stereotypes and create new enemies. There are numerous examples of cooperation between a 
tribe and government agency, but for every one of those there is another site in danger of 
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being destroyed, overrun by tourists or built into a ski-resort.240 Legislative initiatives and 
agency cooperation falls flat when the interests of the government or the public seem 
“compelling” enough to override the religious sanctity of tribal traditions. These issues 
permeate the narrative on contemporary Native American rights, and echo the Rehnquist 
court’s treatment of tribal spiritualities as less important than other claims. The fight is 
however vital to both securing and restoring tribal unity and vitality, and as such, is one many 
Native Americans are willing to take.  
 
5.4 Native American agency and legal theory; reclaiming rights while 
creating new discourses 
5.4.1 Tribal justice system as counterweight 
For many tribes the core focus of decolonization should lie with the revitalization of tribal 
governments and courts. Since the Reorganization Act of 1934, the federal government has 
supported tribal jurisdiction on the reservation by facilitating and revitalizing traditional 
forms of government.241 Native Americans have had their own justice systems since time 
immemorial, with moral codes, customs, and rules which inform and shape their 
communities. However, the colonial settling of the continent destroyed many of these 
practices throughout the nineteenth century. Tribalism was considered a great threat to the 
Manifest Destiny legacy of the United States, and thought to stand in the way of 
modernization.242 Some were outlawed and suppressed, others lost with the annihilation of the 
tribe. When President Roosevelt initiated his “Indian New Deal” he sought to revitalize those 
traditions still alive and create new ones for those whom they had been irretrievable.  
 
Despite this resurgence of self-governance, the act has received criticism for adhering to a 
Westernized model of government, with, for instance, written constitutions. Although it 
allowed for local variations, the uniform provisions of the outline have critics charging that it 
was a mere attempt to integrate Native Americans into the mainstream political society.243 
Tribal courts, on the other hand, have been freer in their development or revitalization of 
traditional forms of justice. As such, they provide some of the most real-live manifestations of 
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decolonized forms of government.244Of course, they must keep their legal structures within 
the confines of U.S. law but are still able to incorporate many traditional values, such as 
alternative forms of punishment. Not only are these courts upholding the law, they are also 
informing new policies entrenched in a tribal worldview, allowing for indigenous knowledge 
to enter the stage as a relevant and even dominating narrative. Moreover, they are distinct to 
the specific needs and traditions of a people, such as the Navajo Nations courts, which holds 
jurisdiction over the entire Navajo Nation, curtailed to the beliefs and practices of its own 
people.245 
5.4.2 Should tribes abandon the courts? 
Wilkins proposes that the Rehnquist court has acted as an imperial body in relation to Native 
American issues, by dictating policies as well as upholding them.246 Although the political 
climate has changed several times since Lyng was decided, there is still reason for Natives to 
be cautious about which claims they try to settle in court. Certainly, for U.S. tribes the 
colonial history of Federal Indian Law has made many reluctant to give into the judiciary as 
an authority on their rights. The failure of the courts to accept the tribal worldviews when 
hearing religious rights cases such as Lyng and Smith is destructive to the quest for self-
determination. By continuing to rely on a narrow interpretation of land as property, the courts 
are perpetuating a monolithic view of culture as one “thing” and not a multitude of different 
beliefs, as should be the norm in a settler nation turned into a multicultural state.  
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court under Rehnquist created legal language that not only denied the 
tribes religious rights but also excluded them all together. Writing the majority opinion in 
Smith, Justice Scalia suggested that the tribes were better of taking their claims to the political 
arena.247 The majority in Lyng refused to address the different notions of land ownership and 
use, and instead clung to property rights as the only valid purpose of the Chimney Rock area. 
By doing so, Justice Brennan claims the courts denies any responsibility for competing claims 
and instead choosing to define such a question outside the boundaries of the judiciary.  
“Such an abdication is more than merely indefensible as an institutional matter: by defining 
respondents’ injury as “nonconstitutional,” the Court has effectively bestowed on one party to 
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this conflict the unilateral authority to resolve all future disputes in its favor, subject only to the 
Court’s toothless exhortation to be “sensitive” to affected religions.” 248 
 
The other side of the coin is, as some claim, that the move away from the courts is beneficiary 
for the tribes, since there are branches and agencies of government better equipped at 
protecting Native American rights, such as sacred sites.249 The Devils Tower climbing ban 
case is a well-known example of such a success. However, it does not deny the fact that there 
are few legally enforceable tools in place for the tribes to use. In Congress there have been 
made several attempts the past decade to introduce legislation directly aimed at protecting 
sacred sites, but none have prevailed.250  
 
Cooperation is regardless of its perils a valid alternative to judicial protection. Moreover, 
without undermining the positive developments of tribal courts, it must be pointed out that 
tribal jurisdiction only goes so far. The plenary power of Congress over the tribes entails a 
number of areas in which the federal government has authority over relevant issues. As such, 
the tribes are forced to enter into the federal legal system in cases such as Lyng, where federal 
property is involved. It implies that ultimate authority over the tribes rest not with themselves 
but the federal government. Consequently, the tribes own quest for self-determination will 
always be dependant upon the power of their colonizers. One can even go as far as to claim 
that, “through law and courts, the very granting of “sovereignty” becomes an act of 
conquest.”251 
 
As such, Native Americans continue to seek out strategies to avoid more losses. The political 
climate of the nation will unavoidably inform where they take their claims. A possible 
strategy is to stay out of the federal courts all together, unless the political will is such as to 
ensure a positive outcome for tribal claims. According to Oneida Nation member and legal 
scholar Steven McSloy, tribes should at all costs avoid being “the miner’s canary.” In other 
words, they should not subjugate themselves to the court system without the knowledge that 
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the government is on their side.252 They should take learning from Lyng and not submit 
themselves to a Supreme Court (or coal mine, if you will) bent on defending the wording of 
the Constitution over their religious survival.  
 
As already mentioned, the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa religious world is very much a live 
today. The road was never built and High Country remains a secluded and sacred area, as it 
has done since time immemorial. To those communities, the outcome of Lyng had some 
positive effects as well. The awakened agency it mustered up among the tribal members 
extended beyond its conclusion. In 1988, the Yurok formed their own government and 
included much of their spiritual beliefs and traditions into the constitution. Additionally, it 
helped revitalize the traditional practices of the three tribal communities and bring back 
dances and ceremonies to create stronger connections to the land. As such, “the process made 
the Indian people stronger. Even the highest court in the land could not stop them.”253 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This final chapter has served the purpose of tying together the events of Lyng with further-
reaching processes in Federal Indian Law and the development of new policies. It has detailed 
how it extended backwards by stating that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act had 
no force in a court of law. It reached beyond by shaping the outcome of Smith, another 
Supreme Court decision denying Native Americans protection to practice their faith. 
Moreover, Lyng regenerated historical processes by which the tribes have been subjugated 
and oppressed. As such, this one court decision provides a chilling example of the extent of 
culturally situated knowledge. It also raises the question of whether the Constitution can 
protect religious freedom for the tribes, or if the interpretation of that by the Rehnquist Court 
is to blame. Finally, this chapter has focused on some of the most recent developments in 
indigenous rights in the U.S. today and of their relevance for the agency of tribal activists, as 
well as the role of decolonization throughout these processes.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusive remarks and afterthoughts 
 
6.1 The Supreme Court’s treatment of Native religions 
A case study such as this has its limits. It is merely one example in a large and complex field, 
and as such has its limitation in what it can provide us with in terms of answers. Nevertheless, 
a legal decision such as this has shown to hold immense authority over an entire narrative. 
Moreover, it can provide us with valuable information on a much larger scale than the case 
itself. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association is a puzzling case in itself. 
Without adding any context to the legal issues, the decision by the Supreme Court majority is 
still noteworthy for its lack of understanding of Native worldviews. Although the Constitution 
is meant to protect freedom of religion for every citizen, the Rehnquist court had a rather 
narrow view of the extent of this protection. Justice O’Connor even wrote in the majority 
opinion that as long as the government did not intend to punish or outlaw a religion, the 
Constitution could not protect any religious activity.254  
 
The court thus found its reasoning, but it is not the form of a threat that makes a government 
action unlawful, it is the threat itself.255 The tribes described the threat simple enough. If the 
Forest Service were to construct a road through the Chimney Rock area, it would destroy the 
spiritual harmony for the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa. Yet the court was able to reject this 
claim because it was merely an incidental effect of government action on government 
property. However, this argument revealed much more than its logic. To the tribes, the tribal 
lawyers, legal scholars, and the dissenting justice, it was clear that most members of the 
Supreme Court were either unwilling or unable to comprehend the religious complexity of 
these tribes.  
 
The majority spent some time outlining the facts of the religious traditions connected to the 
sacred place but focused mostly on the role of the individual practitioner. They neglected to 
include the communal aspect of Native American religions into their consideration and 
instead reduced the religious life to individual pursuit. This also enabled them to compare this 
case to Bowen v. Roy, and thus find a precedent to add weight to their argument. On the other 
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hand they stepped away from previous cases that had created tests for deciding on such 
matters of competing interests, most likely because the lower court had done a too god job of 
spelling out the strong interest of the tribes and the complete lack of a compelling one of the 
government. As it were, the Supreme Court placed the sole burden on the tribes and denied 
them any right to outweigh government interests on government land.  
 
6.2 The colonial structures of indigenous participation in a legal narrative 
The argumentation of the court not only revealed a narrow view of the Constitution and an 
incomplete understanding of tribal religions. Moreover, it exposed the court as an institution, 
which perpetuates ideas of a colonial origin. The relationship between the indigenous and the 
conqueror was already visible before the court yet the majority chose to ignore the inherent 
inequalities present when Native Americans enter the legal discourse. The tribes were forced 
to subjugate themselves to the authority of a legal body that has had such a longstanding and 
painful impact on them, both in a legal and social sphere. As such they were again subjecting 
themselves to the power of the courts to decide the outcome. Moreover, the court would 
determine whether the knowledge presented by the tribes and their lawyers was legitimate.  
 
The Lyng textual information reveals that this was not the case. Although the tribal lawyers 
and witnesses (from the District Court, which was presented as evidence) attempted to present 
the religious world of the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa with all its complexities yet still make it 
relatable to the justices, the court seemed uninterested in meeting them halfway. Instead the 
majority used the tribes’ difference as an excuse to “other” them, or make them irrelevant in 
their exotic behavior. All the different aspects of High Country were lost on the court. The 
sounds, smells, wildlife, rock formation, paths and trees, the atmosphere, the stories, the 
revelations, the spirits that inhabited this place were out of the court’s grasp of understanding.  
 
This lack of comprehension, whether unwilling or not, still affirms the notion that the 
Supreme Court was not interested in including the information given to them into their body 
of knowledge on religion. It is highly likely that had the claim come from Christian or Jewish 
practitioners the outcome would have changed. The judges and actors would have shared an 
understanding of what religion means to them, and they would not have to take into 
consideration that there are different yet as equal ways of interpreting the would around us. 
This is of course to put things very bluntly, and as far as the individual justices go, we can 
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know little of their personal preferences beyond the joint opinion written by the majority, via 
Justice O’Connor. Nevertheless, the court’s text did reveal some of the inherent structures 
embedded in U.S legal narratives. 
 
Moreover, the decision stood out at the time because the political mood of the country was 
going in quite the opposite direction in regards to Native American rights. The momentum 
created by the civil right movements in the 1970’s and the passing of the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act in 1978 were only a few of the markers signaling a positive 
development for tribal rights. As it were, the Lyng decision reminded more of its colonial 
heritage and its postcolonial future. The tribes saw this opportunity as a chance to finally 
establish a legal force for protecting Native religions after centuries of oppression. But the 
court was reluctant to disentangle itself from the subjugating history of indigenous religion.  
 
6.3 The search for Native American agency through postcolonial USA 
The destructive force of the Lyng decision forces us to ask whether there is a chance of 
decolonizing the American court system. The field of law is not too often a subject of such 
studies, at least not by those outside the field of Federal Indian Law or indigenous rights. 
Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, it becomes important to tackle this problem. To 
speak of a postcolonial legal narrative in the United States is difficult per se. First of all the 
country is a settler state and consequently will always exist on a subjugated-subjugator 
foundation, at least in the foreseeable future. Second, to decolonize an academic discipline or 
an institutionalized form of knowledge is a difficult task in itself. It becomes almost 
impossible when those wishing to deconstruct must conform to it in order to be a part of it. In 
other words, since tribal jurisdiction only extends so far, many Native Americans pursuing 
legal claims must take their case to a federal court and thus subordinate themselves to the 
rules and authority of the very institution they wish to dismantle.  
 
Events succeeding Lyng hint at this paradox. Another attempt was made to establish some 
form of legal protection of tribal religions a few years after, but Smith proved almost equally 
disheartening. Although the tribes have had a difficult and contentious relationship with the 
legislative branch of government, and with local authorities, these institutions have for the 
past decade or two been much more responsive both the political climate and the rising voice 
of decolonization and indigenous rights. It enabled the tribes to demand and receive 
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legislation meant at both repairing past wrongs and securing the denial of new ones. From 
these recent development one can also discern the rising authority of Native agency. It was 
the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa who began protesting the Forest Service, and they remained 
involved throughout the entire legal process. It was Natives who started lobbying Congress to 
rectify the wrongs created by the Rehnquist Court. And it is the tribal members, who continue 
to travel to High Country, dance their renewal dances, fight for the integrity of their ancestral 
lands, and continue to resist the forces of oppression.  
 
Where does it leave us? Is there room for Native American agency and decolonization in the 
legal field? Some scholars suggest any decolonization project in the U.S. need to include a 
reform of the court.256 It seems that the contemporary federal institution today are reluctant to 
accept the position Federal Indian Law actually has within a national narrative. The courts 
cannot simply deny that the United States legal discourse must include tribal beliefs, histories 
and worldviews. But it seems it is up to Native Americans themselves to continue to fight 
against this system of oppression, and be agents of their own narratives. The continued fight 
for religious rights, tribal courts, and sacred sites suggests that now more than ever, this 
indigenous people is trying to break through the colonial structures, originally designed for 
their destruction, and construct new spaces wherein they, and they alone, are able to create 
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